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In 1898, in the wake of the Spanish-American war, Spain ceded the colony of Cuba 
to the United States. In keeping with the law of state succession, the Spanish demanded 
that the United States also take on Spanish debts that had been backed by Cuban 
revenues. The Americans refused, arguing that some of those debts had been utilized for 
purposes adverse to the interests of the Cuban people. This, some argue, was the birth of 
the doctrine of “odious debts.” The odious debts doctrine provides that debts incurred by a 
non-representative government and utilized for purposes adverse to the population do not 
need to be repaid by successor regimes.  
This Article tests the historical evidence in favor of the birth of the odious debts 
doctrine at the turn of the twentieth century by considering the treatment of perhaps the 
archetypal odious debt: the debt that Belgium’s King Leopold II undertook to finance his 
horrific exploitation of the Congo Free State (CFS). In 1908, King Leopold was forced 
to transfer sovereignty over the CFS to Belgium. If the doctrine of odious debts existed at 
the time, we might expect to see evidence of it in the public debate about whether Belgium 
was obliged to take on Leopold’s debts. Based on original archival research into political 
debates, litigation regarding Leopold’s estate, and contemporary prices and yields of 
Leopold’s bonds, we see no such evidence.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of odious debts is one of the most debated topics in the 
modern literature on sovereign debt, and has major implications for 
international law and development. In recent years, some version of the 
doctrine has been advanced as a possible justification for the repudiation of 
all or portions of the sovereign debts of Mozambique, Venezuela, Ukraine, 
Iraq, and Ecuador.1 
The most commonly articulated version of the doctrine in the academic 
literature entails three factors and says something along the following lines: 
debt incurred on behalf of a sovereign by a despotic leader, used for 
purposes adverse to the interests of the populace, and purchased by 
creditors who knew that this was likely to occur, is the personal debt of the 
despot and not attributable to the nation.2 The International Law 
Commission, attempting to get agreement around a definition, provided a 
somewhat broader account:  
For the purposes of the present articles, “odious debts” means: (a) 
all debts contracted by the predecessor State with a view to attaining 
objectives contrary to the major interests of the successor State or 
of the transferred territory; (b) all debts contracted by the 
predecessor State with an aim and for a purpose not in conformity 
with international law and, in particular, the principles of 
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.3  
The paradigmatic example is of the dictator who incurs debts to foreign 
creditors in order to purchase arms that his police then use to shoot at pro-
democracy protesters. Once the pro-democracy forces succeed in 
overthrowing the despot, must they still pay for the guns used to shoot at 
them? The odious debt doctrine would say no. 
Whether this rule would be desirable as a matter of market design is a 
central question in the scholarly debate. On the one hand, a doctrine saying 
                                               
1. See Cécile Lamarque, Ecuador’s Illegitimate Debt, in ECUADOR AT THE CROSS-ROADS: FOR AN 
INTEGRAL AUDIT OF PUBLIC INDEBTEDNESS (2007), https://tinyurl.com/yddqewkq; Rodrigo 
Olivares-Caminal, Why Does Mozambique Need to Pay Its Non-Odious Debt?, FIN. TIMES: ALPHAVILLE 
(Apr. 4, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/ya9u329h; The Stench From a Fishy Business in Mozambique, FIN. 
TIMES (July 2, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/yaacxet5; Robin Wigglesworth, Venezuela Crisis Raises Talk 
of ‘Odious Debt’ Doctrine, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/ydeovmzl. 
2. See Lamarque, supra note 1 (articulating the doctrine in the context of the Ecuadorian 
government’s invocation of it). See generally JEFF KING, THE DOCTRINE OF ODIOUS DEBT IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A RESTATEMENT (2016); ODETTE LIENAU, RETHINKING SOVEREIGN 
DEBT: POLITICS, REPUTATION, AND LEGITIMACY IN MODERN FINANCE (2014); Lee C. Buchheit, 
Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1218 (2007); Kim 
Oosterlinck, Sovereign Debt Defaults: Insights From History, 29 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 697, 709 
(2013). 
3. Summary Records of the 1425th Meeting, [1977] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 54, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1977. 
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that the debts of despotic leaders shall be deemed personal to the leader and 
do not have to be repaid by successor governments might deter despotic 
governments from taking power in the first place, and starve them of 
funding when they do.4 And such a doctrine might help set norms of 
appropriate behavior, even in the absence of a meaningful sanctioning 
mechanism. 5 On the other hand, a doctrine of odious debts could 
potentially incentivize further bad behavior by dictators6 or disincentivize 
investment in countries that might desperately need it.7 And even if those 
problems could be overcome, there are institutional hurdles to 
implementing it in the first place.8  
These are fundamental questions about how law shapes markets, and 
how those markets shape law and governance in return. The sovereign debt 
market has long been a significant source of governmental finance; it is one 
important way in which countries raise money for all the things that 
countries do, including basic expenditures like public works. The doctrine 
of odious debts has the potential to alter that source—to reshape the 
sovereign debt market—via a normative evaluation of how a state has been 
governed. That, in turn, should theoretically pass on the costs of lawless 
government to those who knowingly financed it, raise the cost of capital for 
future despots, and encourage better governance going forward.  
We do not attempt to resolve the foregoing issues here. Our modest 
goal is to explore them through a historical case study—one that brings the 
relationship between markets and government into sharp relief. For roughly 
fifteen years, King Leopold II of Belgium (hereinafter King Leopold, or just 
Leopold) ruled the Congo Free State (CFS) as a personal colony, initially 
financing it through loans before he found a way to make it profitable 
through exploitation of the native Congolese.9 Following an international 
                                               
4. See Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AMER. ECON. REV. 82, 87 (2006); 
Ricardo Hausmann & Ugo Panizza, Odiousness Ratings for Public Debt, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Aug. 30, 
2017), https://tinyurl.com/y7thhnlu. 
5. Cf. RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW 6-8 (2017) (describing ways 
in which law communicates values and shapes behaviors beyond its formal role in providing sanctions). 
6. Christiana Ochoa, From Odious Debt to Odious Finance: Avoiding the Externalities of a Functional 
Odious Debt Doctrine, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 109, 110 (2008) (arguing that odious debt doctrine, if 
implemented alone, would set bad incentives for dictators, and that a broader “doctrine of odious 
finance” is preferable). 
7. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 160-62 (2013) (arguing inter alia that the odious debts doctrine could undesirably reduce lending 
for public works in autocratic regimes); Katerina Linos & Jerome Hsiang, Modeling Domestic Politics in 
International Law Scholarship, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 13-14 (2014) (agreeing with Posner and Sykes in part, 
but arguing that the doctrine of odious debt might nonetheless be applicable in cases of personalistic 
dictatorships); Raghuram Rajan, Odious or Just Malodorous?, 41 FIN. & DEV. 54, 54-55 (2004) (discussing 
unintended consequences of an odious debts regime). 
8. See Paul B. Stephan, The Institutionalist Implications of an Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 213, 214 (2007) (arguing that “no satisfactory mechanism exists for instituting an odious debt 
doctrine”). 
9. Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Transferable Sovereignty: Lessons from the History of the Congo Free 
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human rights campaign that publicized the horrors of his misrule, Leopold 
was forced to give up sovereign control, and Belgium was compelled—
reluctantly—to purchase the colony from its king in 1908.10 The atrocities 
in the CFS are by now well-known. But what of King Leopold’s debts? Who 
bore responsibility for those? The literature on sovereign debt has yet to 
investigate whether, when Leopold was ejected from power, there was a 
debate over the odiousness of his debts and whether Belgium, as the 
successor government, was obliged to take them on. 
This historical lacuna is significant for the modern debate. The case for 
a contemporary doctrine of odious debts is largely predicated on an 
argument about whether the law of state succession (which would typically 
require a new regime to honor the debts of its predecessor) has historically 
recognized an exception for odious debts. It is important, therefore, to be 
clear about the exception’s historical lineage both as a matter of justification 
and because doing so can help sharpen the normative debate, providing 
concrete examples with which to evaluate whether the invocation or non-
invocation of the doctrine was desirable.  
Throughout history, there have been many situations in which a 
regime’s debts have been repudiated following political upheaval.11 
Prominent examples include the debts of the Russian Tsar, Imperial China, 
and the U.S. Confederacy.12 In some cases, certain illegitimate debts have 
received what looks to be a market penalty in the expectation that they faced 
a higher than normal likelihood of repudiation—possible evidence that 
repudiation, in the context of despotic governance, is a real possibility.13 
But it is not easy to establish whether any such repudiations were done 
out of a sense of legal obligation or for other reasons, such as a perception 
that the reputational costs would be minimal. Some find enough in the 
historical record to suggest that the doctrine is long established,14 and that 
                                               
State, 69 DUKE L.J. 1219 (2020). The King’s father, Leopold I, also pursued colonial ambitions, but 
without the same drive or scope as his son. Id. at 1226-28 
10. This was itself a remarkable interaction between law and markets. For a discussion, and 
suggestion that the forced sale of the Congo Free State might have useful implications for modern 
international law and practice, see id. at 1252-72.  
11. 1 D.P. O’CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
19-21 (2d ed. 1967) (discussing the evolution of theories of State succession, including the renunciation 
of predecessor debts). 
12. See Buchheit et al., supra note 2, at 1224, 1221, 1213 respectively. 
13. See, e.g., Stephanie Collet & Kim Oosterlinck, Denouncing Odious Debts, J. BUS. ETHICS 205, 207 
(2019); Kris James Mitchener, Kim Oosterlinck, Marc D. Weidenmier & Stephen Haber, Victory or 
Repudiation? Predicting Winners in Civil Wars Using International Financial Markets, 60 J. BANKING & FIN. 
310, 313 (2015). 
14. See e.g., Jeff A. King, Odious Debt: The Terms of the Debate, 32 N.C. J. INT’L & COM. REG. 605, 
607 (2007) (describing the doctrine of odious debt as “well established—subject to some 
qualifications—in cases of government succession”); Robert Howse, U.N. Conference on Trade & 
Development, Discussion Paper No. 185: The Concept of Odious Debt in Public International Law, at 1, U.N. 
Doc. UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2007/4 (July 1, 2007) (concluding that an “odiousness” exception to the 
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when odious debts have been repaid, such as in the case of the South African 
apartheid-era debts, it has been because of other reasons, such as the desire 
to preserve a reputation as a good debtor.15 Others point out that no court, 
international or municipal, has ever explicitly recognized the existence of 
such a doctrine,16 and argue that there is little historical evidence that any of 
the payments or non-payments of despotic debts were driven by beliefs 
about legal doctrine.17 
The CFS could be an especially intriguing part of this historical analysis 
because King Leopold’s debts were passed to Belgium in the years between 
the two most-discussed historical precedents in the odious debt literature.18 
Those are the Spanish-American post-war treaty negotiation from 1898 and 
an international arbitration case involving Costa Rica and Great Britain in 
1923.19 Both arguably support the existence of a legal doctrine of odious 
debts.20 If the story of the CFS does as well, that would strengthen the 
historical chain. If not, it raises serious questions about the historical basis 
for the doctrine.  
The 1898 event was the treaty negotiation between the Spanish and 
American governments over responsibility for Spanish debt backed by 
Cuban revenue streams that took place in the wake of the Spanish-American 
                                               
obligation to repay debts “may indeed form part of the content of equity as ‘a general principle of law 
of civilized nations’”).  
15. HOWSE, supra note 14, at 13-14; KING, supra note 2, at 12; Patricia Adams, Iraq’s Odious Debts, 
526 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 5 (2004). 
16. Tom Ginsburg & Thomas S. Ulen, Odious Debt, Odious Credit, Economic Development, and 
Democratization, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 117 (2007); Olivares-Caminal, supra note 1, at 3. 
17. See e.g., Christoph G. Paulus, The Evolution of the “Concept of Odious Debts,” 68 HEIDELBERG J. 
INT’L L. 391, 402 (2008); Andrew Yianni & David Tinkler, Is There a Recognized Doctrine of Odious Debt? 
32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 749, 771 (2007). 
18. Even when Congo is mentioned, the CFS generally is not. See, e.g., HOWSE, supra note 14, at 
10-16 (enumerating “Key Transitional Contexts Where the Concept of Odious Debt Has Been 
Invoked,” but not mentioning the CFS). Scholars have noted the possible application of the doctrine 
in connection with the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko, who ruled the Congo (which he renamed 
Zaire) from 1965 to 1997. See, e.g., James V. Feinerman, Odious Debt, Old and New: The Legal Intellectual 
History of an Idea, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 210 (2007); Ginsburg & Ulen, supra note 16, at 
115, 125; see also Joseph Hanlon, Defining “Illegitimate Debt”: When Creditors Should be Liable for Improper 
Loans, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE CROSSROADS: CHALLENGES AND PROPOSALS FOR RESOLVING 
THE THIRD WORLD DEBT CRISIS 109, 123 (Chris Jochnick & Fraser A. Preston eds., 2006) (“There is 
perhaps no clearer example of odious debt.”). 
19. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn From Each Other, 6 CHI J. INT’L L. 
391, 404, 411-12 (2005); Lamarque, supra note 1, at 5; Michael H. Hoeflich, Through a Glass Darkly: 
Reflections upon the History of the International Law of Public Debt in Connection with State Succession, 1982 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 39, 60 (1982); Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 4, at 83; Odette Lineau, Who is the 
“Sovereign” in Sovereign Debt?: Reinterpreting a Rule-of-Law Framework from the Early Twentieth Century, 33 
YALE J. INT’L L. 63, 65, 67 (2008). 
20. Some international law historians note even earlier instances of repudiation, such as the 
Mexican repudiation of Emperor Maximilian’s debts in 1867, but the facts of those instances are less 
supportive of an odious debt doctrine than the Spanish-American debt negotiations. See Sabine 
Michalowski, The Doctrine of Odious Debts in International Law, in HOW TO CHALLENGE ILLEGITIMATE 
DEBT 17 (Max Mader & André Rothenbühler eds., 2009).  
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war.21 The U.S. delegation refused to take on some of the Spanish debt on 
the grounds that the proceeds from those debts had been used to suppress 
the Cuban independence movement.22 Researchers have argued that the 
bond markets in 1898 understood the doctrine well enough to factor its 
impact into bond prices, such that the bonds that had the potential to be 
deemed odious traded at a discount as compared to those that were not.23 
The 1923 arbitration was a dispute between Costa Rica and Great 
Britain. The Royal Bank of Canada had made loans to the Costa Rican 
government run by Frederico Tinoco, but the proceeds never reached the 
state’s coffers. After Tinoco was overthrown in 1919, the new government 
in Costa Rica refused to pay the loans. The matter went to arbitration in 
front of the then-Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, William Howard 
Taft, who concluded that the lending was so “full of irregularities” that the 
Royal Bank could not legitimately claim to have thought that it was making 
its loan to the Costa Rican government rather than to Mr. Tinoco himself.24 
Both cases can be read to suggest that something akin to an odious debt 
doctrine existed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in that 
successor governments refused to pay certain debts on the grounds that the 
proceeds of the debts were not used for the benefit of the populations being 
asked to pay.25 But one can also tell these stories in terms of power 
                                               
21. Michalowski, supra note 20, at 17; Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff King & Bryan Thomas, Advancing 
the Odious Debt Doctrine 14-16 (Mar. 11, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), https://cisdl.org/public/ 
docs/pdf/Odious_Debt_Study.pdf.  
22. REX J. ZEDALIS, CLAIMS AGAINST IRAQI OIL AND GAS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS AND 
LESSONS LEARNED 28 (2010); Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 4, at 83. For a fuller, and more 
skeptical, historical discussion, see Louis A. Pérez, Jr. & Deborah M. Weismann, Public Power and Private 
Purpose: Odious Debt and the Political Economy of Hegemony, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 699, 717-20 
(2007) (suggesting that the U.S. refusal is best understood “the logic of the victor imposing the terms 
of peace on the vanquished”). 
23. See Stephanie Collet, The Financial Penalty for “Unfair” Debt: The Case of the Cuban Bonds at the 
Time of Independence, 17 EUR. REV. ECON. HIST. 364, 364 (2013). The leading U.S. commentator on 
these matters in the early twentieth century does appear to draw on the Spanish-American negotiations 
when, in 1947, he writes about which debts should and should not carry over in a cession of territory. 
However, it is not clear whether Hyde is articulating a moral principle or a legal one. Hyde wrote: 
[T]erritory, if occupied by human beings, is not, like a mere chattel, to be 
subjected to such fiscal or other use as may suit the convenience or caprice of 
the existing governmental authority. On principle the resources of that territory 
should not be regarded as capable of complete hypothecation save under 
conditions which do not appear to be essentially adverse to the welfare of the 
occupants.  
1 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY 
THE UNITED STATES § 126 (2d rev. ed. 1947).  
24. Buchheit et al., supra note 2, at 1217. 
25. The following statement, which appears in the introduction of a book arguing that some of 
the Greek debt was odious, is illustrative: 
Future generations will not thank us for the excesses of the current age. They 
may even look up the definition of the ‘odious’ debt. This is a legal theory, 
established in the 1920s, which holds that national debt incurred by a 
government for purposes that do not serve the best interests of the nation should 
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dynamics. After all, the Spanish were apparently willing to arbitrate the 
specifics of which debts should be allocated to them, but the United States 
was not interested in any such nuanced parsing. It had won the war and was 
not going to take on the Spanish debts backed by Cuban revenues.26 A 
similar story can be told about the Tinoco case, again reflecting the 
preferences of the United States.27  
In short, history is central to the debate, and the stakes are high. And 
yet the historical record is thin, which makes historical claims contingent 
and fragile. The transfer of sovereign control and associated debts from 
King Leopold to Belgium in 1908 thus has the potential to shed light on the 
extent to which the key players at the time understood there to be a doctrine 
of odious debts. It also provides a case study of how markets—specifically 
debt markets—can influence and be influenced by debates about proper law 
and governance. We are able to illustrate that story in part through original 
archival research, including parliamentary debates and litigation materials.28 
Part I describes the story of King Leopold’s misrule of the CFS, 
focusing on the two portions of the story that bear on the question at hand: 
how he financed his endeavor, and the transfer of responsibility for his debt 
upon his removal. Part II analyzes how closely the story of the CFS fits 
within the traditional odious debt framework. We find that Leopold’s bonds 
(some of them, at least) satisfy the traditional three-part definition of odious 
debt, but also that there was little discussion of treating them as such at the 
time.   
Part III uses data on bond prices for both the CFS and Belgium to 
address whether the market expected the odious debts to be repudiated. If 
so, then Belgium’s eventual adoption of these debts would have come as a 
happy surprise to investors and should show up as a drop in yields of the 
bonds of the CFS. We find no such evidence, in contrast to what prior 
scholars have found in the United States-Spain context, where the markets 
appeared to anticipate which debts would be repudiated.29 In sum, the story 
of the CFS seems to be a paradigmatic case of odious debt, yet neither public 
debate nor bond yields show evidence that it was treated as such. This casts 
doubt on whether the doctrine was recognized at the time. 
                                               
not be enforceable. 
JASON MANOLOPOULOS, GREECE’S ‘ODIOUS’ DEBT, at xiv (2011). 
26. Sarah Ludington, Mitu Gulati & Alfred L. Brophy, Applied Legal History: Demystifying the Doctrine 
of Odious Debts, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 247, 255 (2010); see also Pérez & Weismann, supra note 
22, at 718-19 (describing the Spanish-American peace settlement as “negotiations between two 
countries vastly unequal in power”). 
27. Ludington et al., supra note 26, at 265.   
28. These original sources are in French; we have provided translations.  
29. See Collet, supra note 23, at 364-65. 
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II. KING LEOPOLD AND THE FINANCING OF THE CONGO FREE STATE 
In order to evaluate King Leopold’s borrowing, the uses to which the 
borrowed funds were put, and the financial obligations ultimately 
shouldered by the Congolese people after the King was ejected, we tell the 
story of the CFS in two parts. First, we describe the debt the King undertook 
to finance his colonial venture. Second, we detail the transfer of those 
liabilities to Belgium, which then allocated the responsibility of repayment 
to the CFS itself.  
A.  King Leopold Finances a Personal Colony 
One advantage of controlling your own country is that you can issue 
bonds. This eventually was to become a source of revenue for 
Leopold almost equal to that of rubber. All told, the king issued 
bonds worth more than a hundred million francs, or roughly half a 
billion of today’s dollars. Some bonds he sold; some he gave to 
favorites; some he kept for his personal portfolio; some he used in 
lieu of cash to pay for public works projects in Belgium. Since the 
bonds were for terms as long as ninety-nine years, Leopold knew 
that paying back the principal would be somebody else’s problem. 
Supposedly the bond money was for development in the Congo, 
but little of it was ever spent there.30 
 Because our story brings together markets and law, it is important to 
begin with an explanation of the ways in which Leopold relied on markets 
to establish his own personal colony. His motivations and methods 
frequently blended private control and political sovereignty. The colony 
existed simultaneously as personal property and a sovereign state, with 
Leopold at the head as both owner and King.31  
This arrangement—political rule as a means of economic profit—was 
deeply ingrained in Leopold. As a young man, he visited Seville, where he 
spent an entire month combing through colonial documents. He wrote to a 
friend, “I am very busy here going through the Indies archives and 
calculating the profit which Spain made then and makes now out of her 
colonies.”32 He became fascinated with a treatise called Java; or, How to 
                                               
30. ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND 
HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 168 (1999). One question we have yet to resolve is who purchased 
the bonds.  
31. This hybrid status illuminates important conceptual questions about the relationship between 
property and markets on the one hand and sovereignty and politics on the other. See generally Eyal 
Benvenisti, Sovereignty and the Politics of Property, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 447 (2017) (discussing 
the tension between property and sovereignty as well as the related tension between economics and 
politics).  
32. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 30, at 37.  
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Manage a Colony, in which an English lawyer explored colonial concessions 
and other ways of profiting via private companies and colonies.33 
Without an army willing to engage in conquest (Belgium had no colonial 
appetite at the time), and with much of the globe already claimed by 
European powers, Leopold turned to purchase as his method of acquisition 
and Africa as his target, pushing his representatives—including Henry 
Stanley—to acquire as much sovereign territory as they could. In King 
Leopold’s Ghost, Adam Hochschild provides one example from the Congo, 
in which the chiefs of Ngombi and Mafela, in return for “one piece of cloth 
per month to each of the undersigned chiefs, besides present of cloth in 
hand,” agreed to: 
[F]reely of their own accord, for themselves and their heirs and 
successors for ever . . . give up to the said Association the 
sovereignty and all sovereign and governing rights to all their 
territories . . . All roads and waterways running through this country, 
the right of collecting tolls on the same, and all game, fishing, mining 
and forest rights, are to be the absolute property of the said 
Association.34  
The “Association” referenced here was a shell NGO that Leopold created 
as he was trying to convince the world that his motives in the Congo were 
humanitarian. Playing the other European powers off of one another and, 
crucially, obtaining the support of the United States, he was able to win 
international recognition of the CFS by the time of the Berlin Act in 1885.35  
This was a triumph, but a hollow one if Leopold could not afford to get 
his new enterprise off the ground financially. In 1887, following two years 
of negotiations, Leopold arranged his first bond issuance, which would 
establish the basic public debt of the CFS.36 This was no mean feat. Just to 
get the bonds listed on the Paris stock exchange, he had to offer the French 
a favorable adjustment of the CFS’s border with the French Congo.37 And 
due to the difficulty of finding a guarantee for prospective investors (the 
Rothschilds and French banks refused to act as intermediaries), the bonds 
were not actually put on the market until February 1888.38  
                                               
33. Id.  
34. Id. at 72. The agreement also ominously pledged “to assist by labour or otherwise” with the 
Association’s “works, improvements or expeditions.” Id. 
35. GEORGES NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, THE CONGO: FROM LEOPOLD TO KABILA: A PEOPLE’S 
HISTORY 266 (2002). 
36. NEAL ASCHERSON, THE KING INCORPORATED: LEOPOLD II IN THE AGE OF TRUSTS 147 
(1964). 
37. Robert Harms, King Leopold’s Bonds, in THE ORIGINS OF VALUE: THE FINANCIAL 
INNOVATIONS THAT CREATED MODERN CAPITAL MARKETS 343, 345 (William N. Goetzmann & K. 
Geert Rouwenhorst eds., 2005). 
38. ASCHERSON, supra note 36, at 147. 
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The first half of the issuance sold well, but by April 1889—and despite 
Leopold’s efforts to artificially prop up prices—the selling price of the first 
half had fallen below the planned listing price of the second half.39 Less than 
half of this second issue was sold,40 despite the Belgian government’s pledge 
to pay for some of it, and the enterprise only ended up raising roughly 30 
million francs—far less than expected.41 This issuance was, in short, 
unsuccessful.42 
It is difficult to know much about the balance sheets of the CFS during 
this period, because it was not until years later that the State even made a 
pretense of releasing anything like financial reports.43 In Belgium, members 
of the Parti Ouvrier Belge44 such as Emile Vandervelde denounced the lack 
of information received from the CFS.45 The Belgian government, however, 
tried to limit questions regarding the finances of the CFS on the grounds 
that it was a foreign country.46 Whatever the precise figures, it is clear that 
Leopold’s colony was not profitable at the outset, and that he was personally 
sinking further and further into debt.47 David Van Reybrouck concludes that 
“[b]y 1890 [Leopold] had already spent 19 million francs on Congo. The 
                                               
39. Id. at 147-48. 
40. The full list and the amounts subscribed by the various banks are provided in Appendix 1. 
41. Id. 
42. THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: THE WHITE MAN’S CONQUEST OF THE 
DARK CONTINENT FROM 1876 TO 1912, at 398 (1991) (“Leopold went to the European market and 
tried to raise a huge 150-million-franc (L6 million) interest-free loan based on a lottery (like premium 
bonds today). The first tranche of 10 million francs (L400,000) had to be discounted at 83 percent of 
par, despite Leopold’s desperate attempts to hold the price at 92. Then the second tranche, 60 million 
francs (L240,000), flopped disastrously. Less than half were taken by the public.”).  
43. An internal memo from the Belgian Finance Minister dated from March 1895 deplored the 
poor quality of the data: “The conclusion to be drawn from the attached note from Mr. VanCutsem is 
that it is impossible, by means of the figures provided by the State of the Congo to see clearly in the 
situation and to appreciate what may be the needs in more or less distant future.” Memorandum from 
the Ministry of Finance (Mar. 20, 1895) (on file in box 588 in the MinFin Oud files at the Archives 
Générales, du Royaume) [hereainfter Archives Générales files]. 
44. The equivalent of the Labour party. 
45. Annales Parlementaires [Parliamentary Annals], Chambre des représentants [House of 
Representatives], Mar. 13, 1903 (Belg.).  
46. Annales Parlementaires [Parliamentary Annals], Chambre des représentants [House of 
Representatives], Feb. 28, 1905 (Belg.).  
47. ROGER ANSTEY, KING LEOPOLD’S LEGACY: THE CONGO UNDER BELGIAN RULE 1908-
1960, at 4 (1966) (“From the later 1880’s the task of ruling a territory eighty times the size of Belgium 
threatened to break Leopold financially.”); PAKENHAM, supra note 42, at 397 (“By 1890 twelve years 
after the King had first commissioned [the explorer] Stanley to open up the Congo, the bankers were 
losing patience . . . . The state’s whole income was less than the proceeds from one small factory in 
Europe . . . .”); DAVID VAN REYBROUCK, CONGO: THE EPIC HISTORY OF A PEOPLE 79 (Sam Garrett 
trans., 2010) (“Between 1876 and 1885 he invested no less than 10 million Belgian francs, but the 
revenues in 1886 amounted to no more than seventy-five thousand francs. By 1890 he had already 
spent 19 million francs on Congo. The huge fortune inherited from his father had gone up in smoke. 
The king was virtually bankrupt.”); see Harms, supra note 37, at 344 (“The shaky financial structure that 
underpinned the activities of the Congo Independent State included bonds, unissued bonds, coerced 
loans, fake loans, a lottery, concessions of territory, stocks held by legitimate investors, and stocks held 
by straw men.”).  
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huge fortune inherited from his father had gone up in smoke. The King was 
virtually bankrupt.”48 
Finance became the King’s obsession: “It was now almost impossible 
for him to see any event, personal or political, except in terms of its 
possibilities in credit.”49 Eventually, and in violation of an earlier pledge that 
the colony would not be a drain on Belgium’s finances,50 the King sought a 
loan from Belgium itself. That loan was made—interest free, in the amount 
of 25 million francs—in return for his agreement to give the Congo to 
Belgium in his will.51 It seems likely that this was a quid pro quo,52 though it 
was not officially acknowledged as such. 
In a covering letter accompanying the will, Leopold wrote that if “it 
pleases the country to contract more binding ties with my possessions in the 
Congo, I shall not hesitate to put them at its disposal. I would be happy to 
see Belgium during my lifetime in full possession of them.”53 Moreover, 
Leopold agreed that “at the end of ten years, either the loan would be repaid, 
or the Free State would be handed over to Belgium.”54 The colony, in other 
words, was security for the loan.55 Or, to the degree that Leopold truly did 
plan to turn the colony over to Belgium, these initial investments might be 
considered a kind of deposit.56 
                                               
48. REYBROUCK, supra note 47, at 79. 
49. ASCHERSON, supra note 36, at 148. 
50. MARTIN EWANS, EUROPEAN ATROCITY, AFRICAN CATASTROPHE: LEOPOLD II, THE 
CONGO FREE STATE AND ITS AFTERMATH 112 (2002); HOCHSCHILD, supra note 30, at 91-92. 
51. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 30, at 94-95; PAKENHAM, supra note 42, at 399.  
52. ANSTEY, supra note 47, at 3 (“There seems little doubt that he agreed to the 1890 arrangement 
as a condition of obtaining a desperately needed loan from a Belgium which was experiencing some 
stirrings of colonial interest and which therefore sought to establish a firm lien on her sovereign’s 
colony.”).  
53. ASCHERSON, supra note 36, at 187; EWANS, supra note 50, at 120; see also HOCHSCHILD, supra 
note 30, at 101 (“Leopold’s will treated the Congo as if it were just a piece of uninhabited real estate to 
be disposed of by its owner.”); LOUIS DE LICHTERVELDE, LÉOPOLD II 246-27 (1926) (“This 
transmission of sovereignty by testament—as if sovereignty were part of a patrimony—recalls the high 
Middle Ages and is still without parallel in the modern world.”) (translation provided by author); 
STEVEN PRESS, ROGUE EMPIRES: CONTRACTS AND CONMEN IN EUROPE’S SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA 
18 (2017) (describing James Brooke’s similar power to devise governing rights over Sarawak by will). 
54. EWANS, supra note 50, at 121.  
55. In fact, Leopold gave Belgium an option “to annex the Independent State of the Congo with 
all the possessions rights and advantages attached to the sovereignty of that State . . . but also on 
condition of assuming the responsibilities of the said State towards third parties.” 1 DEMETRIUS C. 
BOULGER, THE REIGN OF LEOPOLD II: KING OF THE BELGIANS AND FOUNDER OF THE CONGO 
STATE 1865-1909, at 214-15 (1925) (quoting a Convention concluded between the Belgian 
Government and the Congo from July 3, 1980). Belgium could have exercised its option in 1901, but 
“there was no sufficiently strong and determined body of opinion either in the Cabinet or in Parliament 
to insist on this course, whilst Leopold publicly worked against immediate annexation.” ANSTEY, supra 
note 47, at 3. Within a decade, Belgium would pay a much higher price, raising the question of what 
changed so significantly in such a short time, and whether and why the international pressure on 
Belgium was so powerful.  
56. ASCHERSON, supra note 36, at 186. Because Congo remained a colony—now of Belgium, 
rather than of Leopold—the questions of state succession and decolonization would not become fully 
operative until independence in 1960. For an exploration of those questions, focusing particularly on 
2020]  KING LEOPOLD’S BONDS 499 
The bonds and loans helped keep the CFS afloat temporarily, but the 
situation was not sustainable.57 Just how unsustainable is difficult to say, 
since even in the early 1890s it was apparent to Belgian politicians that 
Leopold was “concealing financial data even from the Congo’s own staff, 
[as] he continued to carpenter a variety of schemes to raise further credit.”58 
In late 1894, the Belgian government became aware of a deal the King had 
proposed to conclude with a concession company (partly owned by the 
British, a fact that raised concerns in Belgium) within the Congo. The 
Belgian Prime Minister’s cabinet “unanimously demanded that Leopold 
should drop the Société de Manyema project and provide them with full 
accounts of Congolese finances, and at the end of the year, [the Foreign 
Minister] sponsored a bill for immediate annexation of the Congo.”59 An 
annexation treaty was drawn up to that effect in January 1895.60 
The King then revealed that he had borrowed 5 million francs from 
Alexandre Browne de Tiège (an Antwerp banker) in 1892, which—thanks 
in part to the failure of the Société de Manyema project—he would be 
unable to repay when it came due in July 1895.61 This made annexation both 
more pressing and more problematic, for it added 5 million francs to the 
expected cost, and cost had always been a primary driver of anti-colonial 
sentiment in Belgium.62 The annexation bill foundered that summer, and the 
government ended up loaning Leopold the money he needed,63 with the 
colony (40 million acres of it, anyway) offered up as collateral.64 
One aspect that makes this story so extraordinary is that, as Jean 
Stengers’ research later demonstrated, “Leopold extracted the 5,000,000 
from the Government by telling them a flat lie about a debt which was pure 
fiction.”65 There had never been a loan in the first place. Thus:  
[I]nstead of being transmitted into the account of Alexandre 
Browne de Tiège, most of the money was in turn ‘paid’ by the State 
Treasury to Leopold himself, to cover ‘advances’ made by the King 
to the State. Leopold had thus repaid himself for an advance made 
                                               
the work of Daniel Patrick O’Connell and Mohamed Bedjaoui, see Michael Waibel, Decolonization and 
Sovereign Debt: A Quagmire (Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies, Paper No. 15/2019, 2019).  
57. EWANS, supra note 50, at 157 (“Even with the Fr 25 million loan from the Belgian government 
and the ability to levy duty on imports, the Free State remained, during the early 1890s, on the verge 
of bankruptcy.”).  
58. ASCHERSON, supra note 36, at 188.  
59. Id. at 189.  
60. EWANS, supra note 50, at 168; see also PAKENHAM, supra note 42, at 588 (“[I]n 1895, . . . 
Leopold had almost thrown in the sponge and handed over the Congo voluntarily to Belgium.”). 
61. ASCHERSON, supra note 36, at 190.  
62. Id.  
63. Id. 
64. EWANS, supra note 50, at 166.  
65. ASCHERSON, supra note 36, at 193.  
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by himself to himself, and done so with somebody else’s money.66  
B.  Belgium Buys the Colony 
What these loans financed was, as is now well-recognized, a horror.67 
The scope and scale of the atrocities committed in the CFS have been 
chronicled powerfully by others, and we will not recap that literature here 
except to the degree that it bears directly on the question of whether King 
Leopold’s odious acts involved odious debts in a legal sense. And that 
question, in turn, arises because those debts were eventually passed on to a 
successor sovereign: Belgium. 
 When the nature and scale of Leopold’s brutality against the Congolese 
people became undeniably apparent, the “Belgian Solution”—acquisition of 
the colony by Belgium—was generally regarded by reformers as the best, 
and perhaps only viable, option for the future of the Congo.68 But neither 
Belgium (the buyer) nor Leopold (the seller) were particularly enthusiastic 
about the prospect.  
Belgium, of which Leopold was king (he had to get Parliamentary 
approval to rule the CFS in his private capacity), had not traditionally 
demonstrated much of an appetite for colonies.69 Opposition to 
colonization—in Belgium as elsewhere—was driven partially by financial 
considerations, and was especially pronounced on the political left. In the 
words of a Belgian Socialist newspaper when annexation was discussed in 
1895: “What is one to say about the criminal folly of our governors who are 
light-heartedly preparing to attach to Belgium a gigantic territory, when they 
are still unable to ensure the safety and well-being of the children of the 
Mother-land?”70 And when Belgium’s option to annex the Congo (acquired 
in exchange for the 1890 loan) came due in 1901, “there was no sufficiently 
strong and determined body of opinion either in the Cabinet or in 
Parliament to insist on this course [of exercising the option], whilst Leopold 
publicly worked against immediate annexation.”71 According to Louis 
                                               
66. Id. at 193-94.  
67. Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness was based on his experience in the Congo Free State, and 
Colonel Kurtz’s famous final lines—“The horror! The horror!”—are apt. There are innumerable 
accounts of Leopold’s misrule, see, e.g., EWANS, supra note 50, at 163 (“Africans often found 
themselves having to work extortionate periods for nominal payment, while, as the time left to them 
to grow their own food became limited, famine and disease followed.”); HOCHSCHILD, supra note 30, 
at 4 (“[Congo Free State] was the first major international atrocity scandal in the age of the telegraph 
and the camera.”). 
68. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 30, at 257. 
69. 1 BOULGER, supra note 55, at 33 (“[T]he national character, or perhaps it would be more 
correct to say the national experiences, rendered the Belgian people averse to any policy of adventure 
outside their borders.”). 
70. ASCHERSON, supra note 36, at 271 (quoting the socialist newspaper Le Peuple). 
71. ANSTEY, supra note 47, at 3.  
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Bertrand, the colony had become profitable by that time, and the Belgian 
government essentially acceded to Leopold’s desire to keep it.72   
Leopold’s own opposition to the Belgian Solution was driven in part by 
financial concerns, and in part by a sense that the colony was his own 
personal property.73 In effect, he saw the matter as a question for the market 
to resolve—the CFS was a product of his investment, and could only be 
taken on his terms. In the spring of 1906, Leopold described the impending 
transfer (which by then was inevitable, though he would drag it out for 
another two years) as theft: 
My rights to the Congo are not for sharing; they are the fruits of my 
labours and my expenditures . . . The adversaries of the Congo are 
pressing for immediate annexation. These persons no doubt hope 
that a change of regime would sabotage the work now in progress 
and would enable them to reap some rich booty.74 
Implicitly invoking John Locke, he wrote that “the Congo has been, and 
could have been, nothing but a personal effort. There is no more legitimate or 
respectable right than that of an author over his own work, the product of 
his own labor . . . .”75  
In practice and in his own mind, Leopold tended to blur the distinction 
between personal and sovereign control. In a later trial regarding his 
personal succession, a lawyer defending the Belgian state explained:  
[H]ow can we explain the fact that Leopold II distinguished 
between his personality as the assignee of the removed Crown 
Foundation assets and the Free State, to the point that he felt he 
had to transfer all or part of these assets to the Free State, by a 
subsequent formal provision of the decree? In the simplest way in 
the world. 
                                               
72. Annales Parlementaires [Parliamentary Annals], Chambre des représentants [House of 
Representatives], Feb. 28, 1905, at 815 (Belg.) (“By that time, gentlemen, Congo Free State had become 
prosperous and its leader did not want Belgium to take over at that time. The Belgian government, 
mandated by its ministers’ body to defend Belgium's interests vis-à-vis the Congo Free State, neglected 
these interests entrusted to it. He let the six-month date pass within which Belgium could take over 
Congo or impose new conditions on the independent state.”). 
73. U.S. legal scholarship is rich with discussions of the relationship between sovereignty and 
private property. The classic reference is Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 
(1927) (arguing that the understanding of sovereignty requires consideration of the nature of private 
property). For a recent discussion, see generally the second issue of 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
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74. EWANS, supra note 50, at 224 (emphasis added); see also PAKENHAM, supra note 42, at 655 
(quoting a “royal letter” issued by King Leopold on June 3, 1906, claiming “[m]y rights over the Congo 
cannot be shared; they are the fruits of my labours and my expenditure . . . . It behoves me to proclaim 
these rights to the world.”). 
75. SAMUEL H. NELSON, COLONIALISM IN THE CONGO BASIN 1880-1940, at 85 (1994). 
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By the fact that the King, who had only rather vague notions on the 
exact legal scope of his sovereignty, believed in the possibility of a 
disjunction, a duality between the absolute state that was the Congo 
Free State and the personality of his sovereign, whereas such a 
disjunction was contrary to the most elementary principles of public 
law.76  
He further asserted that “the Congo Free State was an absolute state, or 
even the prototype of the absolute state.”77 This view was shared by the 
Public Prosecutor in the litigation over his assets between his children and 
the Belgian state that followed his death.78 
In part reflecting this vision of absolute control, Leopold continued to 
contemplate alternatives to the Belgian Solution, all of which involved sales 
or transfers that would be to his benefit:  
They do not understand the true interests of the country. It would 
probably be better to sell the Congo to France . . . Is it not wretched 
to have been the King of this State for twenty-two years and to have 
kept nothing for oneself? After all, I am seventy-two years old and will 
not have long to benefit from it.79 
Leopold had insisted that his goals in the Congo were humanitarian, and 
that he had pursued them at personal cost, and he might even have come to 
believe that. But his words and actions also showed that he viewed the CFS 
as a piece of property in which he had invested personal funds, and from 
which he expected a return. 
Leopold’s grasp on the CFS was significantly loosened in 1906. Early 
that spring, Félicien Cattier published Etude sur la Situation de L’Etat 
Indépendant du Congo, which provided a devastating critique of his rule—
largely on financial grounds.80 Increased pressure from the British 
government (some of it brought on by revelations about Leopold’s 
“poaching” of territory in the Nile Valley) and British press (reporting on 
the apparent persecution of British subjects) took its toll.81 But what really 
                                               
76. Cour d’appel [CA] [Court of Appeals] Bruxelles, Plaidoirie de Me Eugène Hanssens, avocat 
de la cour d’appel de Bruxelles pour l’état belge intimé, contre S.A.R. la princesse Louise de Belgique 
et S.A.R. la princesse Stéphanie de Belgique, Comtesse Lyonay appelantes at 60 (Belg.) [hereinafter 
Cour d’appel de Bruxelles].  
77. Id. at 72. 
78. Tribunal de Première Instance [Tribunal of First Instance] Bruxelles, 2e ch., Avis du Ministère 
Public et Jugement, at 52. 
79. EWANS, supra note 50, at 226 (emphasis added). 
80. See generally FÉLICIEN CATTIER, ÉTUDE SUR LA SITUATION DE L’ÉTAT INDÉPENDANT DU 
CONGO 20 (F. Larcier & A. Pedone eds., 1906) (critiquing the exploitative, monopolistic, and absolutist 
fiscal policies of colonial empires, particularly that of Leopold in the CFS).  
81. W. Roger Louis, The Stokes Affair and the Origins of the Anti-Congo Campaign, 1895-1896, 43 
REVUE BELGE DE PHILOLOGIE ET D’HISTOIRE [RBPH] 572, 572-584 (1965). 
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seemed to make the difference was the threat of a growing anti-Congo 
movement in the United States,82 which in the 1880s had been the first and 
most important supporter of Leopold’s claims.83  
Leopold therefore had to sell,84 but the terms of the deal were, from a 
modern perspective, generous.85 Belgium not only took over his debt 
obligations, but also committed to pay for many of his ongoing pet 
construction projects in Belgium (palaces, gardens and more), and pledged 
a 50 million franc payment to Leopold “as a mark of gratitude for his great 
sacrifices made for the Congo.”86 As Hochschild notes, “[s]ome of the debt 
the outmaneuvered Belgian government assumed [and then put on the 
Congolese] was in effect to itself—the nearly 32 million francs worth of 
loans Leopold had never paid back.”87 
To ensure that his pet projects would outlive him, regardless of whether 
the Belgian government continued to support them, Leopold created the 
Niederfüllbach Foundation in 1907 and capitalized it with assets generated 
from the resources of the CFS.88 After his death, both the Belgian 
government and his daughters sought to take possession of those assets, and 
a court battle ensued. A key question in that litigation was whether the assets 
and liabilities that Leopold had generated in his years ruling CFS were 
personal to him or belonged to the state. Given that Belgium was taking 
over the state, its argument was that the law of state succession dictated that 
it was entitled to the assets.89 And that, according to the authorities cited by 
the Belgian lawyers, meant liabilities as well.90 Ultimately, in an agreement 
passed on January 28, 1911, the board members of the Foundation91 agreed 
                                               
82. EDMUND MOREL, E.D. MOREL’S HISTORY OF THE CONGO REFORM MOVEMENT 194 
(William Rogers Louis & Jean Stengers eds., 1968) (“The immediate reason for the King’s decision to 
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83. NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 35, at 266. 
84. The fact that the sale was involuntary does not mean that Leopold had no claim—in effect, 
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Blocher & Mitu Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, 66 DUKE L.J. 797, 803 (2017). 
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86. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 30, at 259 (emphasis added). 
87. Id. 
88. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 9, at 1246. 
89. Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, supra note 76, at 6. 
90. The following three classic authorities on the Law of Nations are cited by the lawyer Eugène 
Hanssens: “The assets of states that cease to exist are actively and passively transferred to the 
successors of these states.” (citing JOHANN CASPAR BLUNTSCHLI ET AL., LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
CODIFIÉ (1870)); “The successor continues the economic and fiscal personality of the abolished state, 
with its advantages and burdens.” (citing Rivier); and “When a state has annexed itself with a foreign 
state, it takes on its account, if it can be expressed in this way, the active and passive debts of the 
annexed territory.” (citing De Maertens). Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, supra note 76, at 42. 
91. Amongst others was the Baron Auguste Goffinet. Goffinet was the executor of Leopold’s 
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to cede the securities to the Belgian government on the grounds that these 
securities had been acquired thanks in part to revenues generated by the CFS 
bonds which had by then been taken over by Belgium.92  
For our purposes, what is important is that there appears to have been 
a clear understanding at the time of the litigation that the law of state 
succession dictated that the successor state took both assets and liabilities 
of the prior one. There is no indication that the Belgian lawyers thought any 
exception existed for odious debts akin to the kind of exception the 
Americans supposedly had created in 1898 after the Spanish-American war.  
To quote the court filings by the Belgian government: “[I]n international 
law there is no succession under the benefit of inventory. The inheriting 
state cannot establish as a condition that it accepts only those commitments 
that appear on the assets side. He must accept all the obligations and rights 
of the annexed state.”93 In sum, we find evidence that the law of state 
succession was thought to be strict, with no exceptions for odious debts.  
To come at the question differently, one might ask whether there were 
any in the Belgian legislature or government who affirmatively did not wish 
for the state to take on Leopold’s debts and what arguments they made. And 
there was indeed a faction that took this view—the leftist faction. In 
parliamentary debates, the socialist leader, Louis Bertrand, explicitly 
questioned the uses to which King Leopold had put the debts:  
Note, gentlemen, and I insist on this point, because this is the 
essential purpose of our inquiry, that when the king dies and 
Belgium takes over the Congo, it is Belgium that will be responsible 
for these debts; it is we who will have to repay the millions borrowed 
without the current government having taken the slightest 
precaution to ensure that these new loans are justified or not!94 
Again though, while we find explicit objections from within Belgium to the 
taking on of Leopold’s debts, we find neither mention of any available 
exception to the law of state succession nor reference to the actions of the 
Americans in the negotiations with Spain roughly a decade prior. And that, 
to reiterate, is despite the fact that there was considerable discussion of 
whether Belgium was obliged to take on the Leopoldian debts. 
The exception to the foregoing is the 1888 lottery loan, where there was 
some disagreement about whether the obligation should be taken on by the 
Belgian state. However, as we explain below, the disagreement had nothing 
to do with the odiousness of the borrower or the uses of the proceeds. In 
                                               
will.  
92. Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, supra note 76, at 22. 
93. Id. at 368-69. 
94. Annales Parlementaires [Parliamentary Annals], Chambre des représentants [House of 
Representatives], Feb. 28, 1905, at 816 (Belg.). 
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1905, when the annexation of the Congo had first been suggested, the press 
and the world of finance95 signaled that they thought Belgium was bound to 
take on the debt.   
The Belgian Finance Minister, represented by Hubert Van Neuss,96 
however, held a different view. According to his analysis, when the Belgian 
government had allowed the bond to be floated, the then-Finance Minister, 
Auguste Beernaert, had clearly stressed that Belgium had no responsibility 
regarding this loan.97 When issued, some of the loan proceeds were set aside 
to build a portfolio98 which was managed by one of the issuing banks.99 The 
loan was thus complex100 because the payment of interest and amortization 
was guaranteed by the resources from this portfolio. 
An internal memo101 questioned Belgium’s responsibility regarding the 
1888 lottery loan, since its reimbursement was supposed to be done through 
this special mechanism. The line of argumentation developed by the memo 
is straightforward: The funds set aside to guarantee the loan were sufficient, 
and the state had therefore no more responsibility for the loan. In other 
words, the portfolio was the loan’s guarantee and the CFS (and Belgium 
even less so) bore no responsibility. Since the portfolio was managed by a 
board in which bankers had the majority (and thus the CFS only a minority), 
the CFS could not be held responsible for the loan. If the value of the 
portfolio was larger than the reimbursement, the contract stipulated that the 
CFS would receive the surplus but the contract did not explicitly state that 
the CFS should intervene if the portfolio’s value ended up being too limited. 
According to Van Neuss, this omission was purposeful. The CFS could 
not be held responsible for bad investments undertaken by the bankers. Van 
Neuss further argued that the lottery bond should be viewed as a lottery 
                                               
95. The memo mentions the intervention of Fr. Roseels, a stockbroker.  
96. In 1905 Hubert Van Neuss was General Secretary of the Belgian Minister of Finance, but he 
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97. Annales Parlementaires [Parliamentary Annals], Chambre des représentants [House of 
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1904, at 4. 
101. Situation Financière et Budget Colonial (undated) (on file in box 590 in the MinFin Oud files 
at the Archives Générales, du Royaume).  
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rather than a bond, and that Belgium’s obligation to take over the debt was 
doubtful. The press took over this argument in 1907,102 creating turmoil on 
the market and prompting Senator Albert Marquis de Beauffort to write to 
the Belgian Finance Minister to clarify the government’s position.103 By 
1907, the investments had proven profitable enough to render the 
discussion regarding the guarantee less pressing.104 This view was shared by 
the financial press.105 
For the other loans, the general view was that Belgium would take over 
the debt. In 1903, the French newspaper Le Temps hinted at the possibility 
that someday the debt from the CFS might be transformed into Belgian state 
bonds should the Congo be annexed.106 Discussing the relative merits of the 
Belgian three percent perpetuity and the four percent 1901 CFS loan, a 
journalist from the Journal des Finances mentioned that should the Congo 
become a Belgian colony the four percent loan would be transformed into 
Belgian bonds.107 A little more than a year later, the newspaper stressed that 
even though the annexation law made a distinction between the debts from 
Belgium and the Belgian Congo, in fact Belgium was morally bound to 
guarantee the debts of the colony, an element which had led to a price 
increase for the Congo lottery bonds.108 In any case, all bonds but the 1888 
lottery loan were listed as debts of the Belgian Congo in an internal memo 
of the Belgian Ministry of Finance from 1909.109 
We have found only one source arguably suggesting that Belgium was 
not legally required to take on the CFS’s debts. An August 22, 1908 story in 
the Washington Post reported that holders of Congolese debt had argued that 
“[s]hould insolvency develop” in the new colony, Belgium “although not 
responsible in principle, would be bound morally to stand sponsor for the 
Congo.”110 But there is no explanation here for those words “although not 
responsible in principle.” More importantly, there is no indication of any 
odious debts type exception, particularly given the words that Belgium was 
“bound morally to stand sponsor”—an odious debt doctrine would point 
                                               
102. With articles published in Le Patriote and Le Petit Bleu in December 1907. Archives Générales, 
supra note 43 (on file in box 590 in the MinFin Oud files at the Archives Générales, du Royaume). 
103. Memorandum from Senator Albert Marquis de Beauffort to Finance Minister (on file in box 
590 in the MinFin Oud files at the Archives Générales, du Royaume). 
104. Fonds d’Amortissement de L’Emprunt à lot de l’E.I. (on file in box 590 in the MinFin Oud 
files at the Archives Générales, du Royaume).  
105. Petite Correspondance, JOURNAL DES FINANCES, June 20, 1908, at 596. 
106. Discussing the merits of the bonds from the CFS the journalist concludes “and we do not 
even consider the possibility of converting the debt of the Congo Free State into a Belgian one if one 
day the Congo were to belong to it.” LE TEMPS, Jan. 26, 1903 (author translation). 
107. Notes et Arbitrages, JOURNAL DES FINANCES, June 1, 1907, at 506. 
108. Notes et Arbitrages, JOURNAL DES FINANCES, Oct. 24, 1908, at 1011. 
109. Intérêts de la Dette du Congo Belge Échus au 30 Juin 1909 (June 30, 1909) (on file in box 
591 in the MinFin Oud files at the Archives Générales, du Royaume). 
110. Congo Deficit Likely. Belgium Bound Morally to Stand Sponsor. Securities’ Holders May Sue, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 22, 1908 (emphasis added). 
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the moral calculus in the opposite direction. 
We have also found a few broad references to Belgium’s moral and 
political obligations to take on and remedy the ills of Leopold’s actions in 
the CFS. But on our reading, these are not about the debt, and definitely not 
about legal obligations.  
A 1906 book by the Jesuit writer Arthur Vermeersch urged:  
Although officially we do not have to answer for the treatment 
meted out to the Congo natives, our honour and the good name of 
Belgium are at stake if a country which is governed by our King and 
largely administered by Belgians, is not worthy of the esteem and 
confidence of civilized humanity.111  
A century later, Hochschild reached a similar conclusion: “Oddly 
enough, Leopold had the Belgian government cornered. The Congo reform 
movement had reached such a pitch of fervor that Belgium’s international 
reputation was at stake.”112 Consider also Arthur Conan Doyle, who was 
active in the Congo Reform Association:  
The Congo State was founded by the Belgian King, and exploited 
by Belgian capital, Belgian soldiers and Belgian concessionaires. It 
was defended and upheld by successive Belgian Governments, who 
did all they could to discourage the Reformers. In spite of legal 
quibbles, it is an insult to common sense to suppose that the 
responsibility for the Congo has not always rested with Belgium. 
The Belgian machinery was always ready to help and defend the 
State, but never to hold it in control and restrain it from crime.113 
Doyle, for his part, took this argument to its natural conclusion and argued 
that Belgium was unfit to rule the Congo, and that its culpability for 
Leopold’s misdeeds should not be transmuted into ownership.114 
Reputation is not the only possible non-legal explanation for why 
Belgium took on the debt. Maybe there was a fear that unhappy creditors in 
countries like Britain and France would join cause with human rights 
crusaders in persuading their governments to seize the CFS for themselves. 
Hochschild writes that “if Belgium didn’t take over the colony soon, some 
powerful country might: France and Germany, long jealous of the King’s 
lucrative rubber profits, had their eye on pieces of Congo territory.”115 
                                               
111. ASCHERSON, supra note 36, at 258 (quoting Vermeesch’s book, and saying that it was 
“widely-read”).  
112. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 30, at 257-58. 
113. A. CONAN DOYLE, THE CRIME OF THE CONGO, at vii (1909); id. at viii (“When Belgium 
took over the Congo State, she took over its history and its responsibilities also.”).  
114. Id. at 123. 
115. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 30, at 257-58. 
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Indeed, E.D. Morel, leader of the Congo Reform Association, had once 
advocated a division of the CFS between Britain, France, and Germany 
(though he would later reconcile himself to the Belgian Solution).116 Still, the 
historical record does not provide much support for the notion that Belgium 
felt compelled to take on the debts because of a fear of gunboat diplomacy. 
Another sticking point with the transfer of the CFS’s liabilities and 
control from Leopold to the Belgian state was Leopold’s effort to retain 
control of crucial portions of the Free State. Specifically, he tried to retain 
ownership of the Domaine la Couronne—the crown domain that Leopold had 
long insisted was necessary to make Congo financially viable, and which he 
now wanted to deny to Belgium.117 Attacks on the treaty primarily focused 
on ownership of the Domaine rather than the debts.118 According to historian 
S.J.S. Cookey:  
The treaty itself only seemed to confirm the fears of the reformers 
[that Leopold would retain control of the revenues of the Domaine]. 
The main provision of its four Articles was to transfer the Congo 
to Belgium with all its assets and liabilities together with an 
obligation to maintain all the rights of third parties.119  
The New York Times denounced this “trick,” saying: “In other words, 
Leopold transfers from his right hand to his left hand the domain which he 
has exploited as private property.”120 
Another explanation with regard to the financial aspects of the 
annexation of the Congo was raised by members of the Parti Ouvrier Belge 
in 1908. Jules Destrée accused the members of the right-wing parties of 
acting in self-interest because they had substantial investments in the 
Congo.121 The Belgian socialist newspaper, Le Peuple, even published a list 
of MPs involved in these investments.122 According to the socialist leader, 
                                               
116. MOREL, supra 82, at 182; HOCHSCHILD, supra note 30, at 257-58 (explaining how Morel came 
to accept the solution of converting the Congo into a Belgian colony).  
117. Belgium Votes to Annex Congo. Deputies Still Refuse to Guarantee Payment of Interest on Congo Debt., 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1908 (“The situation regarding annexation of the Congo independent State was 
thrown into great confusion last year by the action of King Leopold in withdrawing the control over 
the Crown domain, the richest part of the Congo, from the regular Congo administration, in order to 
prevent the passing of the domain to Belgium should annexation be consummated.”). The crown 
domain—held by the Fondation de la Couronne—was an issue of overwhelming importance in the 1907 
negotiations; so much so that it overshadowed the question of how Belgium would actually govern its 
new colony. ANSTEY, supra note 47, at 18. The King ultimately backed down on this demand, in return 
inter alia for Belgium’s agreement to take on the colony’s debts. S.J.S. COOKEY, BRITAIN AND THE 
CONGO QUESTION, 1885-1913, at 212 (1968). 
118. COOKEY, supra note 117, at 212. 
119. Id. at 204. 
120. Fury Caused by Leopold’s Trick. His New Congo Scheme Arouses Bitter Opposition in Belgium. Britain 
is Urged to Act, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1907.  
121. Annales Parlementaires [Parliamentary Annals], Chambre des représentants [House of 
Representatives], June 18, 1908 (Belg.). 
122. Ceux pour qui le Congo est une Bonne Affaire: La Part des Politicians Bourgeois, LE PEUPLE (Belg.). 
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taking over the debts of the CFS would guarantee that no one would 
question the concessions made to private firms.123 
As at Berlin in 1885, when Leopold took ownership of the CFS, the real 
party in interest was absent from the negotiations: the Congolese who would 
ultimately foot the bill.124 This was in part a result of Belgium’s own 
domestic politics: the government was “bound by their promises to the 
Belgian tax-payer that annexation would impose no financial burden.”125 
Jules Renkin, the first-ever Belgian Minister of Colonies (he took office in 
October 1908, just before the transfer), told the British Foreign Office that 
service of the colonial loans would technically be the colony’s responsibility, 
but that it would eventually be covered by a Belgian grant-in-aid.126 
In practice, the Congolese were made—with no say in the matter—to 
pay for their own transfer from one colonial master to another.127 
Compounding the perversity, much of the purchase price ended up back in 
Belgium, as Leopold poured funds into construction projects, museums, 
and the like, burnishing his own legacy while the Congolese were saddled 
with the debt. In a scathing article, Morel wrote sarcastically of the 
Congolese living in the crown domain, “the natives who have the privilege 
of being enslaved in this particular area, will have the honour of contributing 
substantial sums to the Civil List of future Belgian monarchs and their 
offspring.”128 
The Congo Reform Association (C.R.A.) was not hoodwinked, as its 
members “attached the greatest importance to this question of finance, 
which they regarded as the test by which the intentions of the Belgian 
                                               
123. Annales Parlementaires, supra note 121, at 31 (“The interest of the concessionary companies 
in Belgium taking over the succession of the Congo Free State is not debatable . . . . If Belgium assumes, 
as regular and valid, the obligations of the Congo Free State, the interests of the companies are fully 
insured.”).  
124. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 30, at 259 (“Those funds were not expected to come from the 
Belgian taxpayer. They were to be extracted from the Congo itself.”); see also PAKENHAM, supra note 
42, at 662 (“On these modest terms – that would cost the Africans of the Congo ninety-five million 
francs (L3.8 million) – the King agreed to hand over the whole Congo, lock, stock, and barrel, to little 
Belgium.”).   
125. COOKEY, supra note 117, at 223-24.  
126. Id. at 261 (emphasis added).      
127. LEWIS H. GANN & PETER DUIGNAN, THE RULERS OF BELGIAN AFRICA 1884-1914, at 151 
(1979) (“The Congolese taxpayer was left with responsibility not only for the Free State’s debt of 110 
million francs but also for a ‘gratitude fund’ given to the king “in testimony for his great sacrifice in 
favor of the Congo created by him,’ as well as for another 40 million francs for the so-called 
Niederfülbach Foundation, one of the king’s financial instruments, which was ultimately transferred to 
the Belgian state in 1923.”); Steven Johnson, King Leopold II’s Exploitation of the Congo From 1885 
to 1908 and Its Consequences 70 (2014) (unpublished thesis, University of Central Florida), 
http://stars.library.ucf.edu/ 
honorstheses1990-2015/1642/ (“Instead of cancelling the debt that was amassed forcefully and 
unethically, Belgium only sought to increase the Congo Free State’s debt which added to the taxation 
burden during the Great Depression.”). 
128. E.D. Morel, The Congo Cession: What the New Treaty Means, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Dec. 
17, 1907, at 6. 
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government as a whole must be judged.”129 In the words of a 1909 C.R.A. 
memo to the British Foreign Office: 
[T]he Belgian Government, alone among Governments of 
Christendom, claims the right to govern a tropical dependency in 
Africa by means of enormous taxes wrung from its inhabitants, and 
by the issue of loans, the interest upon which it expects African 
subjects to pay, and caps this claim by demanding of these same 
African subjects that they shall provide subsidies for the Belgian 
heir-apparent and his sister, for ex-officials, for missionary societies, 
medical and philanthropic institutions in Belgium, that they shall 
provide for the upkeep of museums, institutes, and tropical 
greenhouses in Belgium and that they shall even pay the salaries of 
the governing body of the Congo in Brussels and the cost of 
newspapers and periodicals, presumably intended for the edification 
of the members of that body.130 
III. WAS THE CONGO FREE STATE’S DEBT ODIOUS? 
There is little doubt that King Leopold’s governance of the CFS was 
odious in a literal sense. To the degree that Leopold’s despotism is even 
debated, the questions tend to be about Belgium’s role and responsibility,131 
or just how many millions of people were killed as a result of his rule, or 
whether it amounted to genocide.132 The question for our purposes is 
whether his debts were odious as a legal matter, under the relevant laws, 
assuming that such a doctrine was recognized at the time.  
In the most commonly articulated version of the odious debts 
doctrine,133 there are three questions that have to be answered in the 
affirmative before a debt can be deemed odious and repudiated. First, to 
what extent was the borrowing done in a personal sense; that is, did the 
leader or government have the consent of the populace in this particular 
case? Second, were the proceeds used largely (or in some articulations of the 
doctrine, exclusively) for the benefit of the leader? And third, did the 
                                               
129. COOKEY, supra note 117, at 259.  
130. Id. at 259 (quoting C.R.A. to F.A., Nov. 17, 1909, FO 403/409).  
131. See, e.g., Raf Casert, Belgian Africa Museum to Take a More Nuanced Look at Colonial Past, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 5, 2018).   
132. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, supra note 30, at 225-34 (discussing attempts to calculate deaths in 
the CFS); REYBROUCK, supra note 47, at 95 (arguing that it would be “absurd in this context to speak 
of an act of ‘genocide’ or a ‘holocaust’,” since there was no intention to exterminate). 
133. The most frequently invoked definition of the doctrine comes from the writings of a Russian 
jurist, Alexander Nahum Sack in 1927. Sack, who advocated a narrow definition of the doctrine, would 
have required all three elements of his definition to be satisfied for a debt to be deemed odious. 
ALEXANDER NAHUM SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ÉTATS SUR LEURS DETTES 
PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIÈRES (1927); see also Buchheit et al., supra note 2, at 
1218-19 (discussing the Sackian definition). 
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creditors know that their funds were going to benefit the leader personally 
rather than the populace in whose name the borrowing was officially being 
done?  
We find that all three conditions were met, which makes it all the more 
notable that the doctrine was never invoked. 
A. Absence of Consent 
The first part of the traditional odious debt definition requires that the 
debt be taken on in the name of a sovereign, but without the consent of the 
people. Although the unusual status of the CFS as a personal colony raises 
some wrinkles, this factor seems satisfied.  
 The debt contracts make it clear that Leopold represented to creditors 
that he was acting as the sovereign of the CFS. For example, Leopold signed 
the 1888 bonds as sovereign, not in his individual capacity. The debts were 
made in the name of the CFS and the payment procedures (matters such as 
the administration of the sinking fund) were placed in the hands of the 
government of the CFS.134 Internal memos from the Belgian Finance 
Minister confirm this interpretation. While discussing the listing of the 1888 
loan on Belgian exchanges and the stamp duty to be paid, the Belgian 
Finance Minister noted that “the exemption from stamp duty is easily 
justified, although de facto established in Brussels, the government of the 
CFS is none the less completely independent”135 The Committee created by 
the Belgian Senate to examine the loan issue concurred: “[I]t is therefore 
necessary to treat the securities created by it [the CFS] in Brussels as foreign 
securities.”136 
 The traditional odious debt analysis focuses on whether debts should be 
considered personal to a leader, as opposed to those of the state. That 
division is complicated in cases of “personal” sovereignty.137 To the degree 
that Leopold was both king and the owner of the CFS, it may be hard to draw 
a line between debts he contracted on behalf of the CFS and those he took 
on personally.138  
 But from the perspective of the odious debts doctrine, those conceptual 
                                               
134. Despite the fact that there was no ambiguity in the contract, some investors asserted the 
existence of a Belgian guarantee for the 1888 loan even though no such guarantee existed in the 
contract. See Advertisement from the International Securities Syndicate, London (on file in box 587 in 
the MinFin Oud files at the Archives Générales, du Royaume). 
135. Archives Générales, supra note 43 (on file in box 587 in the MinFin Oud files at the Archives 
Générales, du Royaume).  
136. Annales Parlementaires [Parliamentary Annals], Chambre des représentants [House of 
Representatives], Apr. 27, 1887 (Belg.). 
137. See generally PRESS, supra note 53 (describing other such personal sovereignties). 
138. MOREL, supra note 82, at 45 (“The very word ‘State’ used in describing an organisation such 
as this was palpably a misnomer, a fiction and subterfuge. What, in Heaven’s name, was the ‘Congo 
Free State’? It was no State.”). 
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difficulties can largely be sidestepped—the relevant question is whether the 
debts were contracted with the consent or for the benefit of the Congolese 
people. It is clear that they were not. And, in fact, Leopold’s personal 
ownership of the colony all but guaranteed as much, as it lacked even the 
limited transparency or responsiveness that one might find in other African 
colonies.139 
B. Absence of Benefit 
As to the second element—absence of benefit to the people burdened 
by the debt—there should likewise be little need for discussion. Far from 
benefitting from the revenue that Leopold raised through his bond 
issuances, the Congolese were subjected to further oppression, as he used 
the funds to set up the Force Publique and other infrastructures of despotism. 
It would be one kind of wrong to extract, by the lash, money to be used for 
the development of the territory itself. Instead, the wealth of the CFS was 
sent to Belgium, with nothing of significance sent back in return.140 
Although there can be no question that the Congolese did not benefit 
from the Congo’s riches, there is debate about who did. Belgian scholar Jean 
Stengers argues that Leopold himself was actually not the primary 
beneficiary. He points out that “[i]n King Leopold’s lifetime, no proof was 
ever offered that the Congo had allowed him to add to his personal wealth,” 
though admittedly “the circumstantial evidence seemed very strong 
indeed.”141 Stengers concludes that “King Leopold extracted money from 
the Congo, but used it almost exclusively to enrich the [Belgian] national 
                                               
139. In that sense, history might have turned out better if the Belgians had more of a colonial 
appetite. See V. Lovett Cameron, Chartered Companies in Africa, 15 NAT’L REV. 464 (1890); see also PRESS, 
supra note 53, at 248 (“[H]istory would have looked different had there been a public check on the 
King of the Belgians’ power early on, if for no other reason than that more parties would have 
demanded a slice of profits and thus diluted his authority.”); REYBROUCK, supra note 47, at 57 (“Kaiser 
William I, Queen Victoria, and Jules Grévy, president of France’s Third Republic, also ruled over vast 
stretches of Africa in 1885, but none of them owned those areas personally. Their colonial policies 
were not a private matter but a government affair, watched over by parliament (chamber of deputies) 
and cabinet. But the Belgian king ruled over the new state in a personal capacity.”).  
140. NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 35, at 20 (“As a good capitalist, the king had to judge the 
success of his colonial enterprise in strictly business terms, that is, in terms of whether or not it was 
profitable . . . . This meant the use of torture, murder and other inhumane methods to compel the 
Congolese to abandon their way of life to produce or do whatever the colonial state required of them.”); 
PAKENHAM, supra note 42, at 588 (“Should Leopold re-invest this profit in the Congo, according to 
the unwritten code practised in colonies elsewhere, to benefit both the natives and European investors? 
Leopold saw no reason why it should . . . . He had put his fortune in the Congo. Now he intended to 
reap the benefit, repaying himself and enjoying the profits.”). Even Reybrouck’s somewhat more 
sympathetic account suggests only that Belgium, rather than Leopold—but certainly not Congo itself—
profited. REYBROUCK, supra note 47, at 61 (“The revenues for which he hoped were not meant to 
develop the Free State, but to be funneled off to Brussels . . . . Leopold used one of his states, Congo, 
to provide the other, Belgium, with new élan.”).  
141. MOREL, supra note 82, at 269. 
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heritage by acquisitions of property, by monumental constructions, and by 
works of urbanization. His obsession was not with his own fortune but with 
the embellishment of his country.”142 
Other critics, both in Belgium and elsewhere, argued to the contrary that 
the King was personally enriching himself through the colony. In 1906, 
Félicien Cattier’s Etude sur la Situation de L’Etat Indépendent du Congo summed 
up this view: 
[T]he clear and indisputable truth . . . is that the Congo State . . . is 
not a colonising state, it is barely a state at all: it is a financial 
enterprise. The colony has been administered neither in the interests 
of the natives nor even in the economic interest of Belgium: to 
obtain for the King-Sovereign a maximum of resources, this has 
been the objective of governmental activity.143 
Cattier was primarily concerned with the King’s abuse of his position for 
personal profit, not with the human rights abuses in the Congo.144 As he put 
it, the CFS was “not a colonial power” but “a financial enterprise . . . 
administered neither in the interests of the indigenous people nor even in 
the interests of Belgium [but] for the benefit of the King-Sovereign.”145 
Despite (or perhaps because of) its bloodlessness, Cattier’s report had a 
powerful impact in Belgium.146 
Cattier noted that “[a]gain and again, when reforms [in the Congo] were 
demanded, the Congo State . . . invoked its poverty as a reason for not 
implementing them. Its budget is permanently in deficit while millions 
which belong to it are wasted in Belgium on luxury works, on suborning 
people, on shady and obscure deals.”147 Cattier calculated that Leopold had, 
on behalf of the Congo, borrowed more than 130 million francs, not 
including the tens of millions from Belgium itself, and earned 70 or 80 
million francs from rubber alone—all measured against an actual budgetary 
                                               
142. Id. at 243. 
143. EWANS, supra note 50, at 217 (translating Félicien Cattier’s Etude sur la Situation de L’Etat 
Indépendent du Congo). 
144. Just ten years earlier, Cattier had written a positive account of the CFS’s humanitarian 
progress. Félicien Cattier, L’Etat Indépendant du Congo et les Indigénes, 27 REVUE DE DROIT 
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146. ANSTEY, supra note 47, at 15; KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 145, at 160 (concluding that the 
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147. EWANS, supra note 50, at 216. Boulger’s fawning biography of Leopold emphasizes that the 
CFS’s “gravest responsibility” was eradication of the slave trade, and goes on to emphasize that “[t]he 
task before the Congo State was immense, and when its slender resources are borne in mind the 
courage and confidence with which it entered upon the struggle must be pronounced remarkable.” 1 
BOULGER, supra note 55, at 188. Others argue to the contrary that “Leopold II directly encouraged 
slave raids.” NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 35, at 20-21 (internal citation omitted).  
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deficit of just 27 million from 1892 to 1905.148  
As for the balance, Leopold insisted that he had not gotten a penny 
from his humanitarian works in the Congo.149 But it was eventually 
discovered that he had gotten a great deal, much of which went to the 
purchase of more than one hundred properties in Belgium, along with as 
much as 65 million francs spent on his palace at Laeken, the Arcade du 
Cinquantenaire, and the Museum at Tervuren.150 Cattier concluded that on 
one representative occasion, the King borrowed 5.2 million Francs to pay a 
1.08 million Franc deficit, and that the remainder wound up in the King’s 
pocket.151 One scholar estimates that Leopold earned $1.1 billion from the 
Congo during his lifetime.152 
Leopold’s use of CFS-related funds was the subject of public debate in 
Belgium in the years leading up to the annexation, as political leaders 
discussed the degree to which Congolese debts could be used to finance 
Leopold’s pet projects and whose responsibility should ultimately be borne 
by the Belgian people. In practice, this would mean the Congolese, but that 
is not how it was discussed. Those debates, which we have located in 
parliamentary and court records, provide a window into the popular and 
political understanding of state succession. But we do not see any 
invocations of the odious debt exception, even by those who criticized 
Leopold and his spending most harshly. 
In 1904, the socialist Louis Bertrand published an article questioning the 
uses made of the funds, including the acquisition of real estate in Brussels 
and in Ostende worth several million Belgian francs. He challenged the 
legitimacy of these uses if the Belgian taxpayer was eventually to foot the 
bill: 
If it was with his money that the king carried out all this work, we 
would have nothing to say. but if on the contrary it is with the 
millions borrowed by the state of Congo, and which finally will have 
to be paid by the Belgian taxpayers that these expenses are made, it 
is necessary to shout at the daredevil. It is even ensured that the 
lucky contractors of the works of Laeken Tervuren etc. . . . are often 
paid in bond[s] of the State of Congo and this at a rate much lower 
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than that quoted on the stock exchange.153 
Denouncing the newspapers presenting Leopold II as a generous king, 
Bertrand went on:  
If Leopold II is generous with the money borrowed by the State of 
Congo and which Belgium will have to repay - we insist on this point 
- he is generous at a low cost, because he is generous with the money 
of all of us.154 
A year later in Parliament, Bertrand reiterated his attack:  
What is the purpose of these millions then? They are used, 
gentlemen, to satisfy royal fantasies and it is useful, at this moment, 
to mention some expenses made for some time by the king, 
expenses of which the press makes great noise, by praising the 
generosity of the sovereign! As everyone knows, in recent years, the 
sovereign of the Congo Free State has made considerable 
expenses.155 
He went on to detail various buildings, roads, villas, improvements to 
the palace at Laeken, a new colonial palace, and purchases abroad, including 
in the South of France: 
Until now, these purchases have been made on behalf of the domain 
of the Congo free State; this is how they appear in the deeds of 
transfer and in the land register . . . . We also know that the State of 
Congo has taken an interest in various cases of pure speculation and 
in other very random cases, such as the famous Chinese railway, for 
example. How many millions have been spent on it? We don’t know 
that. What we know, I repeat, is that these are extraordinary 
expenses made with the money borrowed by the Congo Free State 
and for which Belgian taxpayers will have to pay the charges when 
Belgium takes over the Congo or when the king dies.156 
The socialist leader further asserted that contracts for public works were 
paid to some entrepreneurs without public tender. These entrepreneurs 
were lavishly paid because part of the payment was made with CFS bonds 
that bankers did not want.157 Bertrand concluded: 
These millions, I repeat, are not spent in Congo, but almost 
                                               
153. Bertrand Louis, La Belgique et le Congo. La Danse des Millions, LE PEUPLE, Oct. 19, 1904 (Belg.).  
154. Id.  
155. Annales Parlementaires [Parliamentary Annals], Chambre des représentants [House of 
Representatives], Feb. 28, 1905, at 816-17 (Belg.). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 817.  
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exclusively in Belgium; they are spent on sumptuous works and it is 
the Belgian taxpayer who will one day be responsible for paying this 
huge debt, the proceeds of which are thus wasted!158 
Again, and despite the harsh critique of how the Leopoldian loans were 
being used, the assumption was clearly that Belgium would have to take on 
Leopold’s debts. The reply of the Belgian Finance Minister, Paul Joseph de 
Smet de Naeyer, is not exactly convincing:  
The State of Congo is building, at its own expense, the Tervueren 
Museum, its outbuildings and the training establishments that will 
be annexed to it. These expenses, made in Belgium, have their 
equivalent value now acquired in our country. The State of Congo 
also bears the costs of the colonial garden of Laeken, which 
provides it with undeniable services.159 
One is left wondering how the colonial garden of Laeken was providing 
“undeniable services” to the CFS.  
The use of CFS bonds to pay directly for works carried out in Belgium 
was reaffirmed in the framework of the trial related to Leopold’s succession. 
According to Eugène Hanssens, lawyer for the government, 10,000 bonds 
from the four percent 1901 issue had been directly given to the entrepreneur 
Wauters-Dustin in payment for works undertaken in Laeken and Tervueren 
with other CFS bonds being used for expenses elsewhere.160 
The Belgian government was aware of this fact: 
It goes without saying that immediately after the present dispute 
arose, the government took care to question all those who, because 
of their situation, were in a position to inform it of the situation 
regarding the 1901 and 1904 loans. In particular, he heard Baron 
Van Eetvelde, Baron Aug. Goffinet, M. Liebrecht and M. H. 
Pochez. And all acknowledged that these loans were used almost 
entirely for non-Congolese purposes, adding that it could not be 
otherwise, since the Congo has consistently given surpluses of 
revenue each year since before 1901. 
Baron Van Eetvelde provided this precise and particularly 
interesting information. Having pointed out to the king that the 
allocation of Congo’s resources for purposes other than his own 
was not regular, the King replied that it was necessary to take 
advantage of Congo’s prosperity to constitute “a war chest” and that 
                                               
158. Id.   
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160. Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, supra note 76, at 134-35. 
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this “war chest” was supplied by the 1901 and 1904 loans.161 
Emile Vandervelde was even more explicit in linking directly the atrocities 
made in the Congo and the fact that the loans were used to develop the 
king’s pet projects in Belgium, amongst other the Arcade du Cinquantenaire, a 
monumental triple arch in Brussels:  
Ah! Gentlemen, this is a morally impossible situation. I understand 
that we are for or against colonial policy, for or against the 
immediate annexation of Congo, but you have no courage to be 
either for or against; you persist at an altitude that is not one; you 
allow an exotic autocracy to grow stronger in our constitutional 
country, encroaching more and more on the rights of parliament; 
you abandon to royalty means of action independent of any 
parliamentary intervention; you promise the Belgian people the 
crumbs of your table; you build monumental arcades, which one day 
may be called the arcades of cut hands.162 
The relationship between markets and governance was central to the 
debate about the CFS. Some of Leopold’s most prominent critics 
highlighted what might be thought of as the market orientation of the CFS. 
In Roger Casement’s assessment, “[t]he root of the evil lies in the fact that 
the government of the Congo is above all a commercial trust, that everything 
is orientated towards commercial gain.”163 This commercial orientation 
effectively guided the hands that administered the lashes: “The praiseworthy 
official would be he whose district yielded the best and biggest supply of the 
commodity; and, succeeding in this, the means whereby he brought about 
the enhanced value of that yield would not, it may be believed, be too closely 
scrutinised.”164 
For Morel, the problem was not exactly the commercial orientation, but 
the failure to secure and honor the property rights of the Congolese. In 
other words, he did not necessarily disagree with King Leopold that the CFS 
was property—he simply thought that the King was not its rightful owner: 
The wrong done to the Congo peoples originates from the 
substitution of commerce which is based upon the recognition by 
Europe of native ownership in land and in the produce of the land 
(which the native alone can gather), with the consequent onus upon 
                                               
161. Id. at 139. 
162. Annales Parlementaires [Parliamentary Annals], Chambre des représentants [House of 
Representatives], Feb. 28, 1905, at 821 (Belg.). 
163. EWANS, supra note 50, at 193; see also PAKENHAM, supra note 42, at 661 (quoting the U.S. 
Consul-General, Smith, whose report “might have been drafted by Casement himself,” saying that the 
Congo state was not really a state but “one tremendous commercial organization”).  
164. EWANS, supra note 50, at 198. 
518 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 60:3 
the European to PURCHASE that produce which modern 
industrialism requires, by a system based upon the right of a 
European State to expropriate the Native of tropical Africa from 
his land and from the produce of the land (which produce 
constitutes in tropical Africa the element of commerce), with the 
consequent elimination of the onus upon the European to 
PURCHASE produce which has ceased to belong to the gatherer 
of it.165 
What is notable about this is not just Morel’s recognition of the fact that 
the natives were being pillaged. Rather, it was his claim that Leopold’s 
property-like interest in the Congo was the cause—not a symptom—of the 
atrocities:  
To denounce the cruelties inflicted upon the native population was 
a mere beating of the air, while the basic cause of the cruelties 
remained unchallenged. So long as King Leopold’s claim to 
dispossess his African subjects of the natural wealth of the country 
on the ground that it was his, was not contested, the foundations of 
his system could weather every assault.166 
A statement made by Georges Lorand summarizes the position of part 
of the opposition: “Congo has so far brought coffins to the country and 
dividends to the king and to men of finance his associates.”167 Whatever the 
number of coffins, and whoever received the dividends, it is clear that the 
benefits of the loans did not flow to the Congolese people. The second 
factor of the odious debts definition, too, is satisfied.  
C. Creditor Knowledge 
Of the three elements of the traditional odious debt doctrine, the one 
about which we have the least information is the final one regarding creditor 
knowledge of what conditions they were lending into. In order for the CFS’s 
debts to qualify for the odious debts exception (assuming that it existed), 
creditors must have known, or should have known, that Leopold was 
                                               
165. COOKEY, supra note 117, at 129 (quoting passage from EDMUND D. MOREL, KING 
LEOPOLD’S RULE IN AFRICA (1904)). 
166. MOREL, supra note 82, at 66. He was also the first to note that he was the first to note this: 
“I was the first to show the inseperable connection between immoral economics and personal cruelty, 
the everlasting (and I doubt not, wearisome) preacher of the truth that to rob the native of tropical 
Western African of his trading rights in the produce of his soil is to rob him of his liberty and to destroy 
him.” Id. at 138.  
167. “Le Congo a rapporté jusqu’ici des cercueils au pays et des dividendes au Roi et aux financiers 
ses associés.” Annales Parlementaires [Parliamentary Annals], Chambre des représentants [House of 
Representatives], June 19, 1908, at 179 (Belg.). 
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borrowing for his personal benefit.168 
The issue actually breaks down into two sets of questions: One about 
the doctrine’s applicability, and the other about its existence. To show that 
the odious debts exception applied to any particular creditor, the question 
is who knew what, and when, about Leopold’s misbehavior in the CFS. The 
answer here likely varies, depending on when the debts in question were 
contracted. Perhaps the lenders in the original 1888 loan thought Leopold 
was engaged in a humanitarian enterprise. But Leopold not only was unable 
to sell all of that initial bond issue (about half the bonds went unsold), he 
continued to have to borrow for many years after. As described above,169 
Leopold was using unissued bonds from the CFS’s failed issuances to pay a 
variety of his obligations all the way up to his removal from power in 1908. 
For purposes of our inquiry, however—whether the odious debt 
doctrine was thought to exist—the threshold is different. If the doctrine was 
even arguably applicable to Leopold’s creditors, then one would expect to 
see it discussed. After all, vast sums of money were at stake, and the acts 
that rendered those debts arguably odious were prominent in public 
discourse. Silence regarding the doctrine’s applicability to the facts would 
appear to be evidence that the doctrine did not exist at all.  
Admittedly, it is hard to sift through the silences, in part because 
Leopold worked hard to obscure from the public what was really going on 
in the CFS.170 Where atrocities could not be denied, he blamed the 
individuals involved, rather than the administration as a whole.171 
Given some people’s willingness to believe—or pretend to believe—
that the Congo was being administered with regard to the highest 
humanitarian ideals, this was probably sufficient to keep many in the dark 
in the early years of Leopold’s rule. Indeed, “at the time the rape and pillage 
of the prostrate land continued with much approbation from the world at 
large[,] Leopold was even elected president of the (British) Aborigines’ 
Protection Society.”172  
That message stayed constant during the first few years of the CFS, as 
Leopold scrambled for financing. In Doyle’s assessment: 
During these years—from 1890 to 1895—whatever indignation 
might be felt among traders over the restrictions placed upon them, 
                                               
168. Precisely what level of knowledge is required, and whether the standard should be subjective 
(thus protecting deceived creditors) or objective (covering those who should have known) is a 
contested question. See, e.g., Christoph G. Paulus, ‘‘Odious Debts” vs. Debt Trap: A Realistic Help?, 31 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 83, 94-95 (2005) (critiquing both the subjective and objective tests). 
169. See supra Section I.A. 
170. Annales Parlementaires [Parliamentary Annals], Chambre des représentants [House of 
Representatives], June 19, 1908, at 69 (Belg.). 
171. MOREL, supra note 82, at 175.  
172. MICHAEL DEIBERT, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: BETWEEN HOPE AND 
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the only news received by the general public from the CFS 
concerned the founding of new stations, and the idea prevailed that 
King Leopold’s enterprise was indeed working out upon the 
humanitarian lines which had been originally planned.173 
Morel himself wrote that in the late 1890s, “[o]ver the Congo itself there 
hung a dense fog of mystery.”174  
But that fog was eventually penetrated. Reports from the Congo began 
to filter back as early as the 1880s.175 Perhaps the earliest and most 
prominent critiques came from missionaries, including George Washington 
Williams, a black missionary from the United States who began to draw 
attention to the CFS as early as 1890.176 Historian John Hope Franklin writes 
of Williams: “It is his testimony that brought to the world the first detailed 
account of King Leopold’s holocaust of the Congolese people, atrocities 
that Williams himself characterized as ‘crimes against humanity.’”177 William 
Sheppard, another black American missionary, played a similar role.178 
Throughout the early 1890s, reports mounted in the British press, to the 
point that by 1897 the CFS felt it necessary to issue a memorandum 
defending its position.179 Doyle, noting the “shame” of the European 
nations who failed to take action, pointed to a chain of available sources 
from beginning in the mid 1890s: “In showing the continuity of the Congo 
horror and the extent of its duration (an extent which is the shame of the 
great Powers who acquiesced in it by their silence), I have marshalled 
witnesses in their successive order. Messrs. Glave, Murphy and Sjoblom 
have covered the time from 1894 to 1897; Mr. Clark has carried it on to 
                                               
173. DOYLE, supra note 113, at 16.  
174. MOREL, supra note 82, at 52. Of course, this was Morel’s own account, and he had every 
reason to suggest that his activities and those of the Congo Reform Association were responsible for 
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175. COOKEY, supra note 117, at 35 (“As early as 1888 British humanitarians had attacked the 
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the plunder and destruction of African villages and recruiting slaves as carriers . . . . The public, unlike 
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177. NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 35, at 23. 
178. See generally WILLIAM E. PHIPPS, WILLIAM SHEPPARD: CONGO’S AFRICAN AMERICAN 
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179. COOKEY, supra note 117, at 36-44. 
2020]  KING LEOPOLD’S BONDS 521 
1900, we have the deeds of 1901-04 as revealed in the Boma Law Courts.”180 
In his history of the Congo, S.J.S. Cookey places the date even earlier: “It is 
clear, then, that in the period after 1885 there was abundant evidence on 
which the British government could have justified an intervention in the 
Congo if this had been desired.”181 
Eventually, the wave began to crest across Europe, and “[b]eginning in 
1900 voices began to be raised in Europe against this Belgian ruler who had 
his employees cut off people’s hands.”182 By 1903, “the protest against the 
Congo system was reaching enormous proportions and it was essential for 
the king-sovereign to begin putting his house into some semblance of 
order.”183 
Although the Belgians were not enthusiastic about their king’s colonial 
adventure, neither was there widespread condemnation in response to these 
reports. Until at least 1903, the eminent Belgian historian Jean Stengers 
writes, “the Belgians had a clear conscience about the Congo. They were 
satisfied that King Leopold had brilliantly ensured the prosperity of his 
State. The time was past when the Congo, close to bankruptcy, had had to 
make repeated appeals for financial help from Belgium.”184 This might be 
attributed in part to lack of information. When word of atrocities in the 
Mongalla district reached Belgium in the 1900, “there was an outburst of 
feeling in Belgium,” Doyle (otherwise quite negative in his assessment of the 
Belgians) reported, “showing that it is only their ignorance of the true facts 
which prevents the inhabitants of that country from showing the same 
humanity as any other civilized nation would do.”185 In part, too, Belgium 
was resistant to lecturing, especially from the British, whose hands were 
hardly clean after the Boer War and other colonial misadventures.186   
The year 1903 marked a turning point. In early 1903, an official bulletin 
was released acknowledging the existence of the massive Domaine in the 
Congo, which had been created by secret decree as early as 1896.187 In June 
1903, King Leopold issued another bulletin, which Morel says “was 
translated into English and lavishly distributed in [England].”188 It claimed 
that “[t]he receipts of the Domain, as all the other public receipts, are deposited 
in their integrity in the State treasury . . . .” The very existence of this crown 
                                               
180. DOYLE, supra note 113, at 51. 
181. COOKEY, supra note 117, at 51.  
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183. COOKEY, supra note 117, at 17.  
184. MOREL, supra note 82, at 221. 
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domain had only just been officially acknowledged. But a month later, the 
Belgian Premier in fact acknowledged that, as Morel summarizes, “revenues 
from the ‘Crown demesne’ were not paid into the CFS Treasury, and were 
not publicly accounted for!”189 In other words, revenues went into 
Leopold’s pocket. 
As recounted in detail above,190 the abuse of the Congolese and the 
misuse of CFS funds was a prominent part of Belgian political discourse by 
that time, so it is difficult to imagine that any investor after that point could 
deny knowledge of the facts that at least arguably rendered Leopold’s debts 
odious.  
In any event, the publication of Roger Casement’s report in 1904 and 
of Leopold’s own handpicked Commission in 1905 spelled the end of the 
road. According to historian Roger Anstey, “only with the appearance of 
Casement’s report did the existence of widespread abuses come to be 
accepted; only with the foundation of the Congo Reform Association did a 
vehicle for a really effective campaign come into existence.”191 The 
Commission’s report “made it clear that abuses were widespread in the 
Congo State and that the administrative system itself was the cause of those 
abuses.”192 What impact it had on public opinion is difficult to discern. Some 
say that it “was generally recognized as a severe blow to King Leopold,”193 
while others say that “the report was couched in general and unsensational 
terms, with the result that its impact on public opinion generally was as slight 
as its effect upon lawyers, politicians and those who knew how to read such 
a document was considerable.”194  
Bottom line: News of Leopold’s abuses and personal greed had emerged 
in the international press as early as 1890. They were widely and credibly 
documented—with almost no credible evidence in the other direction. For 
our purposes, this suggests that while there may have been creditors during 
the early years (at the time of the 1888 lottery loan, for example) who 
thought they were lending to a great humanitarian who was seeking to save 
the CFS from the evils of slavery, there should have been suspicion about 
these humanitarian claims just a few years into his rule. 
As described above,195 Leopold engaged in borrowing all through his 
rule. Even his initial bond issue went half-sold in 1888, and he used the 
remaining unissued bonds as a type of currency to pay debts all through the 
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rest of his rule. Indeed, the historian Robert Harms reports that Leopold 
gave two trunks full of these unissued bonds to his French prostitute 
mistress immediately before his death.196 There was therefore at least a 
portion of the Leopoldian debt where creditor knowledge of his 
misbehavior could be inferred. That means that the third and final factor of 
the Sackian definition of odious debt was also satisfied. And yet not only 
did Belgium take on that debt, we see no evidence that anyone thought the 
law of odious debts gave it a legal right to refuse the debt.   
IV. WHAT DID THE MARKET SEE? LEOPOLDIAN BOND PRICES AND 
YIELDS 
In this Section, we use data on prices and yields for a set of CFS bonds 
to examine the question at the heart of this article: Was there a recognition, 
in the context of Leopold’s removal as sovereign of the CFS in 1908, of 
anything resembling a doctrine of odious debts? Thus far, we have found 
no such evidence in either the academic literature, the parliamentary records, 
or the financial press. Here, we look directly to the markets. 
Building on the work of scholars such as Stephanie Collet, we use bond 
price data to discern whether the financial markets expected certain odious 
debts to be repudiated. If the markets did differentiate between those bonds 
more likely to be deemed odious and those less likely to be, that would 
suggest that the markets recognized something akin to a doctrine of odious 
debts. That differentiation is what Collet finds in her paper analyzing 
Spanish bonds in the context of the Spanish-American settlement in 1898, 
where the market seemed to predict that the Americans would refuse to take 
responsibility for the more odious of the Cuban debts.197 
As discussed in the prior Section, news of King Leopold’s misdeeds was 
widely reported as of 1903. Since creditor knowledge is part of the classic 
definition of odious debts, we should—if the doctrine existed at the time—
see the markets treat CFS bonds differently as a function of whether they 
were issued before or after 1904. And this deviation in bond prices should 
have shown up at the point in time when annexation by Belgium began to 
be factored in by the markets. 
The precise date when annexation would have been factored in to 
market prices is hard to pinpoint, but it should have begun by November 
1906. That is the point at which Britain and the United States made clear 
that unless action was taken by Belgium to eject Leopold from control of 
the CFS, they would be forced to take steps of their own, such as organizing 
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an international convention to determine the future of the Congo.198 
Initially, the annexation plan was controversial in Belgium and resisted by 
the anti-colonialist wing of parliament.199 The Belgian government pushed 
for it, though, and a treaty of cession was signed on November 28, 1907. 
And eventually a number of the legislators switched votes, on the grounds 
that there was a humanitarian role for Belgium to play in the Congo, and 
final approval by parliament was achieved on October 18, 1908.200 If 
annexation by Belgium made it less likely that the odious debts would be 
paid, the above-mentioned deviation in bond prices should have manifested 
itself in an increasing fashion around these three dates in November 1906, 
November 1907, and October 1908. 
We can also test the possibility that the definition of odious debts at the 
time was looser than the classic Sackian version that requires creditor 
culpability. If, for example, the version of the doctrine was one where all 
that had to be demonstrated was that the loan proceeds were used in ways 
inimical to the interests of the populace on whose back the loans were made, 
then we should see all of the CFS bonds (regardless of date of issue) take a 
dip in value upon news of the annexation by Belgium.  
Table 1 reports all of the loans and bonds issued by the CFS during 
Leopold’s years in control, starting from 1887 and going to 1908. 
 
Table 1: List of Loans Issued by the Congo Free State201 
Loan Decree Amount in BEF Convertibility Other elements  
2.5% 
1887 loan 
5 July 1887 422,200 No mention As reimbursement for 
former member of the 
Comité d’Etudes du 
Haut Congo 
1888 
Lottery 
Loan 
7 February 
1888 
150,000,000 No mention Lottery 
4% 1896 17 October 
1896 
1,500,000 Not 
convertible 
for ten years 
after the issue 
Issued to cover 
extraordinary expenses 
linked to public works in 
the Congo 
4% 1898 14 June 12,500,000 Not Issued to cover 
                                               
198. ROBERT SENELLE & EMILE CLÉMENT, LÉOPOLD II ET LA CHARTE COLONIALE 49-50 
(2009). 
199. That original 1901 charter envisioned active involvement by the monarch (at the time, 
Leopold). See GUY VANTHEMSCHE, BELGIUM AND THE CONGO 1885-1980, at 41 (Alice Cameron & 
Stephen Windross trans., 2012). 
200. Id. 
201. Situation Financière et Budget Colonial, and Fonds d’Amortissement de l’Emprunt à lot de 
l’E.I. (on file in box 590 in the MinFin Oud files at the Archives Générales, du Royaume); Congo Belge, 
Recueil Administratif des Finances, Fascicule II (1912) (on file in box 592 in the MinFin Oud files at 
the Archives Générales, du Royaume).  
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1898 convertible 
for ten years 
after the issue 
extraordinary expenses 
linked to public works in 
the Congo 
4% 1901 15 October 
1901 
50,000,000 Not 
convertible 
before 1922 
Issued to cover 
extraordinary expenses 
linked to public works in 
the Congo 
3% 
1904202 
1st 
February 
1904 
30,000,000 Not 
convertible 
for ten years 
after the issue 
Issued to cover 
extraordinary expenses 
linked to public works in 
the Congo 
4% 1906 3 June 1906 10,000,000 Exchangeable 
for a 3% 
Belgian loan 
in case of 
annexation 
(option valid 
for five years) 
Linked to railway 
construction. Advance 
for an authorized issue 
to take place later 
4% 
Treasury 
Bills 
 2,040,000  Advance for an 
authorized issue to take 
place later 
 
Of the loans described above, we set aside the loan of 1887, the lottery 
loan of 1888, and the Treasury Bills, because of a combination of their 
unusual features and inadequate pricing data. 
Data on weekly prices203 for the remaining CFS bonds in the Table was 
drawn from the Courrier de la Bourse et de la Banque.204 The Courrier de la Bourse 
et de la Banque gave just one price for the 1896 and 1898 loan, which had 
similar characteristics. We thus treat these bonds as a single issue. Our 
sample ranges from January 1900 to December 1910. In general, prices 
move from one week to the other, suggesting bonds were traded regularly. 
To set these prices into perspective we also collected prices for the four 
percent 1909 bond issued by the Belgian Congo205 and prices for a 
representative Belgian bond.  
                                               
202. This bond as well as the previous one only met limited success. An internal memo from the 
Belgian Ministry of Finance states that only half the three percent loan had actually been issued and a 
notable part of the four percent loan was still available for sale. Emprunts Décrétés par l’Etat 
Indépendant depuis 1901 (on file in box 589 in the MinFin Oud files at the Archives Générales, du 
Royaume).  
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24, 1902; JOURNAL DES FINANCES May 9, 1908; JOURNAL DES FINANCES, June 20, 1908) but also 
because of its complexity which was duly noted at the time (JOURNAL DES FINANCES, Oct. 4, 1902; 
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205. Decree of January 30, 1909, amount issued 6,800,000 BEF, coupon four percent, non-
convertible before 1920, to be amortized in ninety years. 
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To compare bonds with different maturities and different coupons, we 
compute the yield to maturity of the various bonds. Yields to maturity are 
the standard measure to gauge the returns of fixed-income securities. The 
1896, 1898, and 1906 loans were perpetuities. The 1901 and 1909 loans did 
not have a specific maturity, but a sinking fund was created to do buy backs 
on the market and eventually extinguish the debt after 99 and 90 years, 
respectively. We treat these bonds as if they had these maturities under the 
assumption that bondholders whose bonds had been recalled would use the 
proceeds of the sale to buy back a similar bond in order to keep the balance 
of his portfolio.206  
Figure 1 provides the yields of the various bonds.207  
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the yields on the different bonds to be extremely close, 
with the yields on the 1901 three percent loan slightly lower than the others. 
Table 2, which provides descriptive statistics for the yields of the various 
bonds, confirms this impression. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the yields to maturity of the Congo 
Free State bonds208 
 Congo Free State 
 1896-1898 
4% loan 
4% 1901 3% 1904 4% 1906 
                                               
206. For a discussion of this technique, see Collet & Oosterlinck, supra note 13, at 210-16. 
207. Courrier de la Banque et de la Bourse (1900-1910), authors’ computation. 
208. Id. 
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Figure 1: Yields of the Congo Free State Bonds
4% -1896-8 4% 1901 3% - 1904 4% 1906
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Period 1900-1910 September 
1901-1910 
April 1904-
1910 
September 
1907-1910 
Minimum 3.96% 3.91% 3.59% 4.03% 
Maximum 4.50% 4.54% 4.42% 4.51% 
Median 4.18% 4.13% 3.93% 4.14% 
Mean 4.18% 4.15% 3.96% 4.24% 
 
Since the bonds were issued at different points in time, the number of 
observations and the period covered differ across bonds. Despite this, the 
descriptive statistics show a very similar pattern for the various CFS bonds 
with yields ranging from 3.59% to 4.54%. Over a period of ten years, these 
figures strongly suggest that the market (a) made no distinction among the 
bonds as a function of odiousness and (b) generally believed that all of the 
bonds would be honored.  
As a comparison point, it is helpful to consider similar historical 
instances where particular debts of a sovereign were denounced as legally 
problematic and those denounced bonds did suffer significant market 
penalties. The two such instances around the time of the annexation of the 
Belgian Congo are from the aforementioned U.S.-Spain treaty in 1898 and 
the Tsar’s issuance of a bond in 1906 without proper legislative approval. 
The yield pattern we see for the CFS bonds stands in stark contrast with 
what Collet and Oosterlinck find for the Tsar’s problematic 1906 bond and 
what Collet finds with the dodgy Cuban five percent loan that the Americans 
refused to take responsibility for.209 In both cases, the market imposed a 
significant penalty of multiple hundreds of basis points on the dodgy bonds 
as compared to their virtuous counterparts. We see nothing of the sort with 
the CFS bonds. The market treats the dodgy and the virtuous debts the 
same, suggesting no difference in expectations of repudiation.210 Reporting 
in the financial press confirms this view.211  
                                               
209. See Collet, supra note 23, at 374; Collet & Oosterlinck, supra note 13, at 213. 
210. A possible complicating factor with the foregoing analysis is that several of the bonds that 
we examine had conversion options. The bond prices thus reflect the price of the expected revenues 
derived from holding the bond minus the value of the option. Conversion options thus affect the yields 
to maturity. Hence, in theory, by not taking this conversion option into account we overestimate the 
yield to maturity for bonds with these options. Any overestimation, however, is likely to be small. 
During our sample period only two bonds (1896 and 1898 loans) could be converted. Yet, their yields 
are very close to the yields of the other four percent loans in our sample suggesting the market did not 
give much value to the option. 
211. The following quote from the October 24, 1908 issue of the Journal des Finances, is an example: 
The law of annexation of Congo to Belgium, whose text has just been 
published in the Belgian Official Journal, draws attention of the market for these 
securities. Although the law has specified that the debts of the colony and the 
metropolis will remain separate, it is clear that Belgium is becoming morally 
528 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 60:3 
V. CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of odious debts is perhaps the most debated legal doctrine 
in international finance. And almost every discussion of this doctrine begins 
by invoking a set of debt repudiations from the turn of the twentieth 
century—most famously, the United States’ repudiation of certain Spanish 
debts backed by Cuban revenues at the conclusion of the Spanish American 
war. 
But the scholarly and historical debate about odious debt has ignored 
one especially remarkable change of government: The removal of King 
Leopold II from sovereign control of the CFS in 1908. Because of his 
astoundingly odious rule, Leopold was ultimately forced to surrender 
control of his personal colony. And yet the debts he incurred on the backs 
of the people of the CFS were not imposed on him personally, as the odious 
debt doctrine would require. Instead, those debts were kept squarely on the 
Congolese. 
We embarked on this project because we wanted to know why the debts 
had not been repudiated. We imagined that we would find in the historical 
record interesting debates about the costs and benefits of repudiation 
among legislators in the Belgian parliament. After all, part of the motivation 
for Belgium taking over control of the CFS from Leopold was to remedy 
the humanitarian crisis Leopold had created. Further, a significant concern 
in Belgium—a country that had thus far had resisted the impulse to become 
an imperial power—was the economic cost of running a distant colony. 
Surely, therefore, there must have been debate over whether to do what the 
Americans had done just a decade prior. 
But we find no evidence of any such debate—not in the parliamentary 
debates, not in the historical accounts, and not in the financial data. Best we 
can tell, there was no understanding in 1908 in Belgium that there was a legal 
option to repudiate King Leopold’s odious debts. That tends to cast doubt 
on whether the doctrine of odious debts was actually recognized at the time.  
Perhaps the CFS was unique, however, such that the treatment of 
Leopold’s debts should not be taken as evidence against the historical 
foundation of the odious debts doctrine more broadly. While we cannot rule 
out that possibility, we also find it hard to accept the arguments that would 
distinguish it.    
First, maybe the Leopoldian debts were different from typical sovereign 
                                               
responsible for servicing the Congolese debt, in the same way that the French 
state is morally responsible for the debts of his colonies. However, we know the 
first-class security of Belgian finances. It is therefore ensured on the stock market 
that the prices of the Congo Lots, which, in recent days, are already showing 
signs of effervescence, are to quickly exceed the price of 100 francs. JOURNAL 
DES FINANCES, Oct. 24, 1908. 
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obligations because he controlled the CFS in his personal capacity. In effect, 
it was his property. But this argument makes the case for the applicability of 
the odious debt doctrine even stronger. The core of that doctrine is the 
recharacterization of the debts incurred by despotic leaders in the name of 
the state as their personal debts. If Leopold’s debts were personal all along, 
all the more reason to regard them as odious.  
Second, maybe Belgium was so isolated from the international legal 
community in 1908 that the U.S. repudiation of Cuban debts in 1898 had 
not fully penetrated the debate. This narrative is implausible even within the 
narrative about the CFS itself, given the active and heated debate among 
international law luminaries in the 1880s about whether King Leopold 
should be allowed to take individual control of the CFS.  
Third, maybe the colonial context was different. Maybe oppression of a 
colonial peoples, while purporting to civilize them, was not considered 
problematic enough to justify the invocation of the odious debt doctrine. 
The flaw here is that these were essentially the grounds that the United Sates 
invoked in repudiating the Cuban debt, purporting to care about the welfare 
of a colonial people and their right to mount an independence movement 
against an oppressive imperial power.212 
Fourth, the historical record tells us that a part of the price that Leopold 
negotiated for, when he sold sovereign control of the CFS to Belgium, was 
that Belgium take on the CFS debts. But the suggestion that Leopold had 
any leverage here is strange given both that he had already sold Belgium the 
option to annex the CFS years prior. Further, this was no ordinary market 
transaction. There was only one buyer and the seller had no option but to 
sell. It seems unlikely that Leopold would have been able to force Belgium 
to take on the CFS debts if Belgium had not believed itself obligated to do 
so. 
We are sympathetic to the need for a rule by which creditors bear some 
responsibility for making sure that their lending does not facilitate 
oppression of subjugated populations. But, at least based on our study, the 
historical record seems like a shaky foundation on which to rest such a 
doctrine. Our energies would be better spent in arguing for a new treaty 
regime. 
 
 
  
                                               
212. SACK, supra note 133, at 162 (citing Treaty Series, no. 4, 1919, at 26); Michalowski, supra note 
20, at 17 (summarizing the American argument against repaying the Cuban debts incurred under 
Spanish rule). 
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Appendix 1: List of banks involved in the issue of the 1888 
Lottery loan and number of bonds subscribed 
 
In 1888 
La Société Générale pour favoriser l’Industrie nationale    7500 
La Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, suecursale de Bruxelles   5000 
La Banque de Bruxelles      5000 
Léon Lambert, banquier, à Bruxelles     5000 
Philippson Horwitz & C°, banquier, à Bruxelles    4000 
Balser et C°       2000 
Cassel et C°       2000 
 
In 1902 
La Société Générale pour favoriser l’industrie et le commerce   7500 
La Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, suecursale de Bruxelles   5000 
La Banque de Bruxelles      5000 
Léon Lambert, banquier, à Bruxelles     5000 
Edouard Empain, banquier, à Bruxelles    4000 
E.M. Philippson, banquier, à Bruxelles    4000 
La Banque d’Outremer      4000 
La Société Générale Africaine     2500 
La Société Asiatique      1500 
Balser et C°       2000 
Cassel et C°       2000 
La Succursale du Crédit générai Liégois, à Bruxelles   1500 
La Banque Internationale de Bruxelles    1500 
La Caisse générale de Reports et de dépôts    1500 
Josse Allard, banquier, à Bruxelles     1000 
J. Matthieu et fils      1000 
Le Crédit Général de Belgique     1000 
 
Source: Contract (Feb. 8, 1888) (on file in box 587 in the MinFin Oud files at the Archives 
Générales, du Royaume) and Emprunt de 1888, Contrat du 28 Novembre 1902 Avec les Banquiers 
Belges (Nov. 28, 1902) (on file in box 591 in the MinFin Oud files at the Archives Générales, du 
Royaume).  
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